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This dissertation examines the possibility that cognitive engagement with 
fictional movies, stemming from either individual motivations for movie viewing or 
from moral ambiguity as a characteristic of story protagonists, may result in increased 
thoughtfulness about moral themes, real world issues and movie authors. After 
responding an online survey to determine their motivations to watch movies, 154 
college-aged participants saw clips edited from feature films in which protagonists 
were portrayed as either unambiguously bad, or morally ambiguous. Participants then 
rated their enjoyment of the movie, the characters, the movie authors, and suggested 
topics they would like to discuss with friends after watching each clip. Participants 
also rated their interest in reading more information about the movie and the movie 
authors. Participants seeking affective gratifications from movies (hedonic) were more 
likely than those seeking cognitive motivations (eudaimonic) to suggest moral issues 
as topics of conversation when characters were ambiguous. Participants seeking 
cognitive gratifications from movies (eudaimonic) were significantly more likely than 
hedonic viewers to propose movie authors and real world issues as topics of 
conversation, but, contrary to expectations, they were not more likely than others to 
connect these issues to the self. Viewers who had a dual orientation to movies (high in 
both hedonic and eudaimonic motivations) were more likely than other groups to  
judge movie authors as technically competent, and to like unambiguously bad movies 
and bad characters. Different patterns of thoughtfulness and enjoyment between 
hedonically and eudaimonically motivated groups may indicate that they process 
ambiguity through different cognitive schemas. Results regarding thoughtfulness 
about morality and real world issues are discussed in terms of movies‟ potential to 
foster individual and social change. The results regarding thoughts about authors are 
discussed in terms of their relevance to the theoretical debate on fiction as a 
sophisticated form of communicative exchange between authors and audiences.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When processing fictional stories, audiences often make moral evaluations of 
characters. These evaluations are known to drive liking for the characters and overall 
enjoyment of the story, especially when characters are unambiguously good  and their 
antagonists are unambiguously evil (Raney, 2004, 2005; Raney & Bryant, 2002; Zillmann, 
1994, 2000; Zillmann & Bryant, 1975, 1986). Recent research on the processing of morally 
ambiguous characters shows that although they are liked less than unambiguously good 
characters, they are still enjoyed by audiences, because they offer the possibility of cognitive 
engagement and thoughtfulness, which is increasingly being acknowledged as a motivation to 
enjoy fiction (Nabi & Krcmar, 2004, Krcmar & Renfro, 2008, Oliver & Raney, 2008). The 
study presented here examines the possibility that audiences high in motivation to appreciate 
fiction thoughtfully –known as “eudaimonically” oriented to fiction (Oliver & Raney, 2008), 
are likely to respond to character morality, especially moral ambiguity, differently than those 
who are motivated to appreciate a story “hedonically” –this is, to obtain from fiction mostly 
positive affective gratification and pleasure.  In particular, this study explores the possibility 
that cognitive engagement, -stemming from either individual motivations  to movie enjoyment 
or from moral ambiguity as a characteristic of protagonists, may result in increased 
thoughtfulness about moral themes, real world issues, and movie authors . 
Participants in this study were shown movies that had either ambiguous characters 
who engaged in some good and some bad actions, or unambiguously bad characters who only 
engaged in morally bad actions. After watching each movie, participants quantitatively rated 
their affective and cognitive liking of the characters, and their overall enjoyment of the movie 
– a set of measures intended to extend our growing understanding of movie enjoyment. The 
study also examined extra-narrative responses; this is, the ways in which audiences respond to 
fiction by connecting it to non-fictional dimensions, such as the self, the real world, and the  
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story‟s authors. Participants had the opportunity to list thoughts about the movie that they 
would be interested in discussing, and they quantitatively rated their likelihood to read further 
information about the authors and authorial intentions. 
Extra-narrative responses, and in particular responses to story authors, are a form of 
audience response that has been neglected in traditional communication research on fiction 
processing. Research on audience‟s representations of fictional authors is scarce, probably 
because in many instances authors are expected to be self-effacing, and audiences are 
expected to be absorbed exclusively in the story world.  Some theorists have gone as far as 
arguing that there is no communicative intention in fiction, inasmuch as authors are not 
attempting to engage in a back and forth dialogue with audiences (Dixon & Bortolussi, 2001). 
Critics of this idea note that such a stance is based on a limited “conversational” understanding 
of communication (Gerrig & Horton, 2001), which would require readers and audiences to 
talk back to authors for communication to be present, a notion of communication which is 
basic and at odds with more complex understandings of the process (Gibbs, 2001). There 
surely are instances in which fiction is consumed by audiences without even thoughts of 
authors, and these instances are still communicative in a broad sense. But there are also 
instances of thoughts about authors arising in audiences, for example when audiences are 
willing to engage with author information or ponder authorial intention. What these thoughts 
mean as part of a more traditionally defined communication process, is a relevant question, as 
well as an empirically unexplored one (Bortolussi & Dixon, 2003; Gibbs, 2001).  
Chapter 2 below presents a more detailed account of the relationship between moral 
evaluations of characters, liking of characters, and enjoyment of movies. It presents an 
overview of extant research on the effects that the moral standing of characters have on 
character liking, and on enjoyment. The chapter introduces in more detail the concepts of 
eudaimonic and hedonic orientations to fictional movie enjoyment, and the relationship these 
orientations have to character liking and movie enjoyment. The chapter also introduces the  
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distinction between affective forms of character liking and cognitive forms of character liking. 
Throughout the chapter, predictions about the study‟s results are presented when relevant, in 
the form of hypotheses or research questions. This chapter includes all hypotheses about 
character liking (cognitive and affective), and movie enjoyment.  
Chapter 3 summarizes research on the ways in which movies prompt (or not) 
thoughtfulness about morality in audiences, particularly the effect of moral ambiguity of 
stories on peoples‟ likelihood to engage in general moral thoughtfulness. The study introduces 
hypotheses on the possible effects that moral ambiguity and movie enjoyment orientation are 
predicted to have on emergence of morality as a topic of discussion. The chapter also 
introduces the idea of extra-narrative thoughts: viewer responses that are unrelated to the 
character and the plot, including responses that connect movie content to the self and to real 
world issues. 
Chapter 4 focuses on one particular kind of extra-narrative thought: thoughts about 
authors. Thoughts about authors are connected to a key interest in this study –the issue of 
fictional narratives as communication.  Particular interest is paid to viewer responses that 
imply awareness and interest in movie authors and author intentions. Throughout this chapter, 
predictive hypotheses are introduced when relevant. This chapter includes all hypotheses 
regarding author thought responses (offered by participants as topics of interest for 
discussion), technical evaluations of authors, and interest in author information.  
Chapter 5 presents the methodological structure of the study, a multiple message 
experiment with one manipulated independent variable (character ambiguity: ambiguous, 
unambiguously bad) and one measured independent variable (movie enjoyment orientation: 
dual, exclusively eudaimonic, exclusively hedonic, low). The study provides a detailed 
account of all dependent measures used, the constructions of measurement scales, and the 
coding scheme used to categorize and analyze participants‟ open ended thought list of 
discussion topics.   
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Chapter 6 presents the analysis of the data collected, including an analysis of the 
manipulation‟s success, and hypotheses testing for the dependent variables of interest. Results 
are organized by dependent measure.  
Chapter 7 discusses the results in the light of the predictions made, the theoretical 
background, and unexpected patterns of response that emerged.  
Finally, Chapter 8 considers some implications of the study‟s findings for current 
topics of interest in the processing of narratives, and suggests future avenues of research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ENJOYMENT AND CHARACTER LIKING 
Moral evaluations and movie enjoyment 
Making moral evaluations about movie characters has long been recognized as 
essential to understanding and enjoying narratives. Making judgments of characters' moral 
standing is often an automatic response to fictional stories (Zillmann, 1994, 2000). Moral 
evaluation of a character seems to be a piece of information that is key for readers to both 
understand and enjoy a story, because it provides necessary cues as to which characters should 
be liked (Raney, 2004). Affective Disposition Theory (ADT) –a robust and far-reaching 
theory to explain media enjoyment, is grounded on a long standing body of evidence that 
shows that people enjoy media stories to the extent that the characters perceived as “bad” 
come to negative outcomes and the ones perceived as “good” come to happy endings (Raney, 
2002, 2004, 2005; A. A. Raney & Bryant, 2002; Zillmann, 1994, 2000; Zillmann & Bryant, 
1975, 1986).  
Recent formulations of ADT conceive of moral evaluations as an element of a 
cognitive schema that people use to approach narratives (Raney, 2004). A cognitive schema 
acts as a framework of expectations and knowledge used to evaluate and respond to a given 
situation, or in this case, a story.  When confronted with a fictional drama, audiences activate 
dramatic story schema. This schema, built from previous experiences with the genre, indicates 
that a useful way to make sense of and enjoy the story is to identify good and bad guys, side 
with the good ones, and root for them to have a happy ending. This idea is not new; it goes all 
the way back to Aristotle‟s Poetics, who prescribes this schema as the ideal dramatic 
construction. To this extent, it is reasonable to define this schema as a traditional narrative 
schema for drama stories, and ADT research shows that audiences are savvy in adhering to it 
when processing stories.   
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However, not all stories are constructed in this way. Increasingly popular stories 
present characters that portray a mix of moral and immoral traits (morally ambiguous 
characters) or even characters that, even if predominantly immoral, are the protagonists of the 
story (anti-hero characters). In the last years, research on fictional entertainment has begun to 
address how people process and enjoy narratives in which none of the protagonists are morally 
good.  
Current research on ADT suggests that these narratives may be considered by 
audiences to be a different genre and may be processed through a different schema. Antihero 
narratives, for example, can be enjoyed if audiences are told, before seeing the movie, that the 
protagonist is an “antihero” (Raney, Schmid, Niemann, & Ellensohn, 2009). That bit of 
information seems to activate a different set of expectations and a processing schema different 
to the traditional narrative schema described by ADT. In the case of the antihero narrative, 
alignment with exclusively “good” characters would lead to frustration and minimize 
enjoyment. Respondents in the Raney et al. (2009) study enjoyed a character whose immoral 
actions were not justified as much as a morally justified character. Since they were told a 
priori that the unjustified character was an “antihero,” a different schema appears to have been 
activated and guided liking for the character and enjoyment of the movie. 
Another possibility is that cues provided within the narrative are used by audiences to 
determine what kind of engagement with the story will lead to most enjoyment. For example, 
there is evidence that people are able to disengage from moral evaluations if this is necessary 
to enjoy a violent video game (Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper, Hartmann, & Vorderer, 2006), and 
that movie viewers can use moral disengagement cues provided in the narrative itself to be 
able to enjoy antihero narratives, where the antihero commits violent or cruel acts (Shafer, 
2008). In both these cases, the participants are not told a priori that they should expect an anti-
hero, but the prevalence of immoral actions (in this case, violence and extreme cruelty) 
indicates to viewers that seeking to like characters or avatars because of goodness would be a  
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waste of time, and ultimately frustrating. In the case of the Shafer (2008) study, moral 
disengagement cues appeared in the form of justification for violent acts in several ways, for 
example, dehumanization or euphemistic labeling of the victim, attribution of blame, etc. 
(Bandura, 1990, 1991; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). These processes 
strip the victims of their standing as objects of moral protection such that, in the eyes of the 
viewers, the violent acts are not really problematic, making the movie more enjoyable and the 
moral evaluations of the antihero perpetrator more lenient or non-existent.   
A different approach shows that morally flawed characters can be enjoyed even in the 
absence of a justification for their moral transgression or of cues for an antihero schema, as 
long as there are other –non moral, dimensions  that produce involvement with the character, 
such as beauty, realism, or relevance to the self (Konijn & Hoorn, 2005). If a movie 
emphasizes beauty or achievement as the characteristic that makes the protagonist worthy of 
interest, moral considerations may stop driving liking and movie enjoyment. 
In the study reported on here, participants were exposed to either ambiguous moral 
characters –who did both bad and good things, or unambiguous characters who did only bad 
things. The clips were open ended, such that there was no sense of whether the characters 
were rewarded or punished in the end. Overall, however, the mood of the clips was rather 
grim, so in no case were happy endings implied. Traditional ADT predictions would depend 
on the relationship between the perceived morality of characters and their outcomes, with 
enjoyment stemming from happy endings for good characters and unhappy endings for bad 
ones. However endings were uncertain at best and grim at worst.  According to one ADT 
rationale, unambiguous movies would be enjoyed better than ambiguous ones, because 
characters go unrewarded, which may be enjoyable if the character is bad, but not so enjoyable 
of the character is somewhat good, as in the ambiguous version. A second option is that 
participants may want an unambiguously bad character to be punished more severely than by a 
vaguely grim and open ending, and may consider uncertainty and openness an appropriate  
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ending for an ambiguous character but not an unambiguously evil one. In this case, ADT 
would suggest that the ambiguous movie would be enjoyed more. There is some evidence 
(Raney, 2005) that audiences prefer extreme (even disproportionate) punishments for morally 
bad characters. A vaguely sad ending for a bad character may not be enough punishment, 
whereas a somewhat hopeful ending for a character that is able to evoke at least some positive 
affect may be appropriate. Thus the prediction for effect of character morality follows the 
second option: 
H1: Participants will enjoy movies with morally ambiguous movie   protagonists more 
than movies with unambiguously bad movie protagonists. (Main effect of moral 
ambiguity on movie enjoyment) 
  The hypothesis above is based on the ADT notion that to the extent that a character is 
good the character is liked, and to the extent that the character is liked, his or her success is 
enjoyed. The notion of “character liking” implicit in that theory is affective. Morally good 
characters have been found to be enjoyed because they evoke positive affect and facilitate 
identification and empathy, whereas morally ambiguous and morally bad characters are less 
likely to elicit these feelings. Viewers are said to feel a positive affective connection to a 
character, similar to the affect that they may feel for people they know in real life (Zillmann, 
1994). In this study, this kind of affective liking is measured by asking audiences whether they 
would like to know the character or someone like them in real life.  
On the other hand,  morally ambiguous and morally bad characters have recently been 
found to be enjoyable as well, because they are as transporting, suspenseful and cognitively 
engaging as morally good ones (Krakowiak & Oliver, 2009). Morally ambiguous and morally 
bad characters, despite their moral failings, are just as likely to make audiences absorbed into 
the story world (transportation) and to keep audiences interested in the development of the 
plot (suspense and cognitive engagement). Indeed, Krakowiak (2009) finds that narratives 
portraying morally ambiguous characters are enjoyed just as much as the ones portraying good  
9 
or bad characters. In her study, much of the enjoyment of morally ambiguous characters 
comes from them being “cognitively engaging”. Cognitive engagement with characters may 
create a path towards enjoyment that does not necessarily depend on moral goodness and 
subsequent affective disposition. In this study, we measure cognitive liking of characters 
(evaluations of the character as fascinating, interesting, engaging) separately from affective 
liking, in an attempt to check for these different pathways to enjoyment for morally flawed 
characters (ambiguous and bad).  
The ambiguous characters in the current experiment do some good things, which 
fosters affective liking, and are more complex (they do good and bad things, instead of only 
bad things), which we predict fosters cognitive liking. This leads to hypotheses 2 and 3, 
regarding main effects of moral ambiguity of affective liking and cognitive liking. 
H2:  Movies with morally ambiguous characters will be more likely than movies with 
morally unambiguous characters to elicit affective liking for the character. (Main 
effect of moral ambiguity on affective liking) 
H3:  Movies with morally ambiguous characters will be more likely than movies with 
morally unambiguous characters to elicit cognitive liking for the character. (Main 
effect of moral ambiguity on cognitive liking) 
Both hypotheses predict higher levels of liking (affective and cognitive) for 
ambiguous characters than for unambiguously bad characters, shedding little light on the 
distinct pathways towards movie enjoyment. The distinction is expected to emerge more 
clearly when moral characteristics of the protagonist are examined in conjunction with the 
other independent variable in this study:  hedonic and eudaimonic movie enjoyment 
orientations. 
Hedonic and eudaimonic movie enjoyment orientations 
Audiences vary in the motivations they have for consuming fiction and the 
gratifications they take away from it. Traditionally, measurements of media preferences,  
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enjoyment and liking have used general statements gauging whether people “enjoy” media 
content. Generally, such measurements focus on positive affective dispositions and 
experiences with a message. More recently, there have been some efforts to distinguish the 
dimensionality of the enjoyment construct, mostly recognizing that there are both cognitive 
and affective dimensions to enjoyment, although the definitions of what each dimension 
entails are not completely consistent. 
The affective dimension of enjoyment has been conceptualized has being placed in an 
elevated mood, having empathy for a character, or simply having a sense of affective liking 
for a character (Zillmann, 1991, 2003). The cognitive dimension has been traditionally 
considered to refer to evaluations viewers make about characters, including moral judgments 
(Raney, 2002; Raney & Bryant, 2002), and social comparison between characters (Mares & 
Cantor, 1992). In all these cases, both affect and cognition are linked to the character 
evaluations, rather than to more global evaluations that audiences may have of their 
experiences and expectations from fiction.  
A more fruitful approach in this regard may be the construct of hedonic and 
eudaimonic orientations to fiction enjoyment as individual differences between fiction 
consumers (Oliver & Raney, 2008). Audiences motivated hedonically seek pleasure and 
positive affect from their experience with stories, and enjoy narratives to the extent that they 
get these gratifications. Audiences motivated eudaimonically seek meaningfulness, insight and 
poignancy (Oliver, 2008), and enjoy stories that can provide that. Research using test-retest 
scale analysis shows that these motivations can be quite stable preferences, and can indeed be 
considered individual differences (Oliver & Raney, 2008), although the authors also consider 
it possible that an individual is motivated to hedonic enjoyment in some occasions and 
eudaimonic enjoyment in others. A third option, not mentioned in the scale development, is 
that some audiences might be motivated dually, seeking both pleasure and meaning from their 
fiction. Likewise, a group of audiences might be seeking neither pleasure nor meaning from  
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fiction (most likely, a group of people that does not actively seek fiction). In this study we use 
Oliver‟s Eudaimonic and Hedonic enjoyment motivation scales to create a four-category 
variable of movie enjoyment orientations: Dual, Eudaimonic, Hedonic and Low. Dual oriented 
participants would rate high in both the hedonic and eudaimonic scales, indicating that they 
seek both pleasure and meaningfulness from fiction. This group probably will represent 
participants that can foresee enjoying different kinds of movies at different times –an idea 
consistent with Oliver‟s intuitions, but for which no data currently exist. Eudaimonically 
oriented viewers seek mostly meaningfulness and rate low in hedonic orientations. 
Hedonically oriented viewers seek pleasure and positive affect from films, and rate low in 
eudaimonic motivations. Finally, “low” motivated participants rate low in both forms of 
gratification. Extant research only reports differences between exclusively eudaimonic and 
hedonically oriented fiction consumers, but we consider that the difference between viewers 
oriented exclusively to one enjoyment goal (eudaimonics and hedonics) and viewers who 
claim they would get satisfaction in both hedonic and eudaimonic ways is worthy of 
exploration. Dual oriented viewers may represent a specific kind of audience that is more 
flexible in its approach and expectations about movies, such that both affective and cognitive 
gratifications are satisfying to them, at either different times or maybe even simultaneously. 
As will become clear below, most hypotheses regarding movie enjoyment orientation 
are stated in terms of high eudaimonicity or hedonicity, as suggested by existing research in 
the area.  Full support for these hypotheses would, in general, indicate that audiences behave 
following either a eudaimonic or a hedonic approach to enjoyment. However, the inclusion of 
a dual (and low) motivated group allows us to explore possibly different patterns in these 
participants.  
Overall, audiences motivated hedonically rate higher in optimism, spontaneity and 
humor scales, whereas those motivated eudaimonically rate higher in need for cognition, 
reflectiveness and search for life meaning scales. The two groups also recall different  
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reactions to their “favorite movie”. Those motivated hedonically recall feeling more upbeat 
responses, whereas those motivated eudaimonically recall feeling more contemplative, 
emotional and somewhat disturbed (Oliver & Raney, 2008). It also seems to be true that 
people who are in tender emotional states are more likely to be interested in watching drama, 
films that are sad and films that explore human connections (Oliver, 2008), a result that 
counters affective mood management theories, which predict that audiences will seek to get 
out of negative moods by choosing content that distract them from their stressful experiences 
(Zillmann & Bryant, 1986).  
Audiences oriented hedonically prefer genres such as comedy and action (Oliver & 
Raney, 2008). These two genres are less likely than drama to produce in viewers a “lasting 
impression”, measured by items such as “I continue to think about this movie” and “I don‟t 
imagine I will remember this movie for too long” (Bartsch & Oliver, 2008). In short, 
audiences with hedonic orientations do not prefer films that will require them to ponder on 
them after viewing them. Hedonic enjoyment seems oriented towards experiencing 
transportation into a narrative world –the feeling of being lost or completely immersed in a 
story world, to the point that the real world is forgotten (Gerrig, 1993; Green & Brock, 2002; 
Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004). On the other hand, eudaimonic viewers prefer thought 
provoking movie genres like drama (Oliver & Raney, 2008; Bartsch & Oliver, 2008), that are 
likely to spur thoughts about connections with real world issues. Eudaimonic orientation also 
correlates highly with Need for Cognition (Caccioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984), a scale that 
measures the extent to which people engage in and enjoy cognitive and thoughtful activities 
(Caccioppo, Petty, Fenstein & Jarvis, 1996).  
  Hypotheses 2 and 3 formulated earlier predict that participants in this experiment will 
affectively and cognitively like morally ambiguous characters better than unambiguously bad 
characters. However, because eudaimonically oriented viewers like being thoughtful about  
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movies and characters, they may be more likely than hedonically oriented viewers to like 
characters cognitively  
H4: Viewers high in eudaimonic orientation (dual and eudaimonic) will be more 
likely than viewers low in eudaimonic orientation (hedonic and low) to cognitively 
like characters (Main effect of movie enjoyment orientation on cognitive liking) 
Moreover, movie enjoyment orientation may make a difference in the way moral 
ambiguity affects cognitive and affective liking. As we reported in the previous section, 
Krakowiak found that morally bad and morally ambiguous characters were enjoyed because 
they were cognitively challenging (Krakowiak & Oliver, 2009). It is likely that morally 
ambiguous characters are more cognitively challenging than exclusively bad ones, and we 
would expect eudaimonically motivated viewers to be more interested and engaged by these 
cognitive challenges than exclusively hedonically motivated viewers, who may affectively 
appreciate the “goodness” in the ambiguous characters, but be cognitively turned off by their 
complexity. Viewers high in eudaimonicity may be more likely to cognitively like the 
ambiguous characters, and, through that cognitive path, to enjoy the morally ambiguous 
movies. 
H5: Viewers high in eudaimonic orientation (Dual and Eudaimonic groups) will be 
more likely than viewers low in eudaimonic orientation (Hedonic and Low) to 
cognitively like ambiguous characters. (Interaction effect of movie enjoyment 
orientation and moral ambiguity on cognitive liking)  
H6: Viewers high in eudaimonic orientation (Dual and Eudaimonic groups) will be 
more likely than viewers low in eudaimonic orientation (Hedonic and Low) to enjoy 
movies with morally ambiguous characters. (Interaction effect of movie enjoyment 
orientation and moral ambiguity on movie enjoyment)  
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CHAPTER 3 
MORAL AND EXTRA-NARRATIVE THOUGHTS 
  Eudaimonic orientations towards movie enjoyment indicate that experiences had 
during watching a movie are not the only driving force behind movie processing. At least a 
subset of movie viewers desires to be thoughtful about movies even after they have ended. In 
this study, participants were asked to list topics that they would discuss with others if they 
were to talk about each movie clip. The next two chapters focus on thoughts and attitudes that 
viewers may have about movies, beyond the movie experience.  
Ambiguity and Moral Thoughts  
One effect that moral ambiguity can have on thoughts about movies is to increase 
thoughts about morality. A content analysis of informal movie reviews online (Barriga & 
Shapiro, 2007) showed that viewers were more likely to refer to moral themes in a movie 
review if the movie had morally ambiguous characters than if it had morally unambiguous 
characters, a sign that ambiguity prompts people to continue pondering the unresolved moral 
stances presented.  
In that study, morally unambiguous movies were likely to be processed with the 
perspective of an unambiguously good character in mind (the protagonist), whereas in this 
study the unambiguous character is exclusively bad.  If it is moral ambiguity that fosters 
thoughts of moral themes, we would expect the previous pattern to repeat itself, regardless of 
the differences on unambiguous characters. On the other hand, if moral thoughts are prompted 
by the presence of extreme moral violations (exclusive moral badness), we would expect a 
reverse pattern in this study, such that the morally ambiguous characters elicit less moral 
thoughts than the morally unambiguous (bad) characters. Thus, we have competing 
hypotheses regarding the emergence of moral thoughts in response to the movies. 
H7a: Morally ambiguous clips will be more likely to elicit moral thoughts than 
morally unambiguous clips. (Moral thoughts are elicited by ambiguity).  
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H7b: Morally unambiguous clips will be more likely to elicit moral thoughts than 
morally ambiguous clips. (Moral thoughts are elicited by unpunished moral 
violations). 
In the 2007 study, moral thoughts were overall scarce. The scarcity of moral thoughts 
is maybe explained by a variety of challenges involved in recognizing moral issues. The 
process of  recognizing the moral relevance of a situation –moral or ethical sensitivity, 
involves perception, appraisal and interpretation of unstructured stimuli or situations (Rest, 
1984). It requires affective processes in the form of empathy for characters, which activates 
moral principles, and acts as a cue for moral relevance (Hoffman, 1991; Pizarro, 2000). Moral 
sensitivity also requires cognitive activation, in the form of an awareness of alternative moral 
options, possible consequences of moral or immoral actions, and recognition of how different 
people (characters) might be affected by a certain course of action. (Bebeau, 2002).  Indeed, 
people in general are not particularly good at detecting moral elements of news stories if these 
are not made salient (Lind, 1997; Lind & Rarick, 1999; Lind, Swenson-Lepper, & Rarick, 
1998). However, some individual differences in viewers may increase the likelihood of 
detecting and reflecting on moral issues. The ability to detect the moral implications of a 
situation may be higher for „moral chronics‟, people for whom moral thought is chronically 
activated in the form of an available cognitive schema (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez, 
Lapsley, Hagele & Lasky, 2006), and people whose reading goal is “studying” have higher 
levels of reading comprehension and interpretation of moral issues than those whose goal is 
entertainment (Narvaez, van den Broek, & Ruiz, 1999). In summary, although moral thoughts 
are likely to be scarce, it is possible that viewers who are motivated to be thoughtful and 
motivated by cognitive rather than entertainment goals are more likely to propose moral issues 
as topics of movie discussion. Viewers high in eudaimonicity are the most likely to respond to 
this cognitive challenge in general, which supports the prediction below:  
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H8: Viewers high in eudaimonic orientation will be more likely than viewers low in 
eudaimonic orientation to express moral thoughts. (Main effect of movie enjoyment 
orientation on moral thoughts)  
Extra-narrative thoughts, the self and the real world 
Moral thoughts are, of course, not the only thoughts likely to emerge in response to 
movies. There is some evidence that in the presence of moral ambiguity in a story, audiences 
are particularly likely to turn to reflection on extra-narrative elements, that is, elements that go 
beyond the characters, the plot and the story world (Hakemulder, 2000). Extra-narrative 
thoughts include thoughts about the self, and the “real world” (and thoughts about authors, 
which are treated separately in Chapter 4).Wilson and Busselle (2004) found that the majority 
of thoughts produced in immediate response to a movie were narrative thoughts –this is, 
thoughts focused on the movie‟s plot and characters. In contrast, Barriga and Shapiro (2007) 
found that most thoughts expressed in online movie reviews (expected to have been crafted 
with some delay to movie viewing) were extra-narrative thoughts. The lapse in time between 
movie viewing and responses may contribute to thoughts that connect movie content with 
non-movie content. Since the present study asks for immediate responses we would expect to 
find a pattern more consistent with the Wilson study, with an overall higher proportion of 
narrative thoughts, given that plot and characters are still quite fresh in the participants‟ 
memory. However, it is also possible that groups high in eudaimonicity produce more extra-
narrative thoughts because their motivation towards meaningfulness includes an explicit 
interest in “the human condition” and “the world” (see Methods section for the detailed 
description of the Eudaimonicity scale), and because the question asked in this study 
specifically asks for thoughts that will be discussed “later” with friends or others. Thus,   
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H9: Viewers high in eudaimonicity (eudaimonic, dual) will be more likely than 
viewers low in eudaimonicity (hedonic, low) to produce extra-narrative thoughts in 
response to the movie clips.  
One subset of extra-narrative thoughts are thoughts that connect movie content with 
the self.  There is some evidence that in a situation of character moral ambiguity, audiences 
engage in comparisons between their own moral beliefs and norms and those of the characters, 
imagining how they would act in similar moral situations, and evaluating how morally 
acceptable the behaviors portrayed would be for them (Hakemulder, 2000), a scenario 
compatible with Bebeau‟s (2000) description of an ability to compare different courses of 
moral action. Audiences can use their own sense of morality and their experience to decide 
whether the moral behavior of the character is acceptable or not. Hakemulder (2000) interprets 
his findings in the context of literature as a “moral laboratory”, an environment in which 
readers can consider the impact of morally conflictive decisions on the self, by safely taking 
the role of the characters, without the risk of hurting others or being affected by the 
consequences of the characters‟ actions. His perspective is parallel to Oatley's (1994) and 
Tan's (1996) understanding of stories as “emotion simulation machines”, where people can 
experience emotions safely. The comparison of movies‟ consequences to moral actions and 
the self imagined in those scenarios might be likely to emerge as a topic for movie discussion. 
In the case of the study presented here, Hakemulder‟s results would be supported if 
ambiguous movie clips elicited more thoughts about the self than unambiguous movie clips. 
However, it is also possible that only viewers high in eudaimonicity connect movie content 
with the self. Since one of their explicit motivations for movie watching is finding relevant 
meaning, they might be higher in thoughts about the self than those low in eudaimonicity, 
regardless of moral ambiguity conditions. They could, for example, focus as much on  
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emotional as on moral thoughts about the self.  Thus, there are two predictions for unprompted 
thoughts about the self. 
H10: Morally ambiguous movie clips will be more likely than morally unambiguous 
movie clips to elicit thoughts about the self in participants. (Main effect of ambiguity 
on self thoughts) 
H11: Viewers high in eudaimonicity (eudaimonics, dual) will be more likely than 
those low in eudaimonicity (hedonics, low) to express thoughts about the self after 
watching the movie clip. 
Despite Hakemulder‟s claim, the mass media storytelling environment may not 
always be experienced as “safe”. Audiences may worry about the effects of a movie on society 
at large. When audiences, for example, evaluate news media that is perceived to have broad 
reach, they are more likely to perceive the messages in the media as hostile to their own values 
(Gunther & Liebhart, 2007). People process messages in mass media venues not only from the 
perspective of themselves, but with a concern for others that might be reached by the message, 
its themes and the way those themes are addressed. It is likely that moral uncertainties or 
ambiguities are perceived as hostile to one's own values, leading to thoughtfulness about the 
real world issues addressed in the message, and the beliefs, attitudes and values held about 
those issues. Thoughts about “real world issues” prompted by movie content are another form 
of extra-narrative thought. They emerge when a viewer stops thinking of an issue in terms of 
the movie plot (e.g. “I wonder why Monty decided to become a drug dealer”) and starts 
thinking of it in terms of an exemplar of the world beyond the narrative (“The movie shows 
the damage that even small time drug trafficking brings to everyone involved”). As with extra-
narrative thoughts in general, participants high in eudaimonicity are more likely than those 
low in eudaimonicity to ponder the connection of the movie to the real world as part of their 
response to the viewing experience.   
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H12: Viewers high in eudaimonicity (eudaimonic, dual) will be more likely than 
viewers low in eudaimonicity (hedonic, low) to express thoughts about the real world 
in response to the movie clips. (Main effect of movie enjoyment orientation on real 
world thoughts) 
A third kind of extra-narrative thoughts are thoughts about authors and others 
involved in making the movie. Thoughts about authors reflect audience‟s awareness of stories 
as created messages, and they merit especial consideration in this study, because of their 
implications to our exploration of fictional narratives as communication. The relevance of 
fiction as communication, and this study‟s hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
movie ambiguity, movie enjoyment orientation and interest in story authors, are examined in 
the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4 
FICTION, AUTHORS AND EXTRA-NARRATIVE THOUGHTS 
Processing of fiction authors as a communication phenomenon 
Some theories addressing the psychological processing of narrative directly reject the 
notion of narratives as communication between authors and audiences (Dixon & Bortolussi, 
2001). Other theories of narrative enjoyment and appreciation -most notably Transportation 
Theory (Gerrig, 1993; Green, Garst & Brock, 2004) and Affective Disposition Theory 
(Zillmann & Bryant, 1975; Zillmann, 1994; 2000) do not address communication between 
authors and audiences as part of their models. Readers of fiction are conceived not as 
addressees in acts of communication, but as side participants who observe and are transported 
into a story world, temporarily losing access to real world facts (Gerrig, 1993). There seems to 
be a commonly shared notion that fictional stories are not communication or, at least, that their 
intent is not communicative in the sense of creating a relationship between senders and 
receivers (Gerrig, 1993; Dixon & Bortolussi, 2001). There is indeed evidence that fictional 
narratives may be engaging enough to completely transport audiences into the story world and 
disengage them from evaluations of arguments and their sources at least while they are 
reading the story (Green, Garst  & Brock, 2004; Green & Brock, 2002). Being transported or 
absorbed into a story hinders the possibility of making inferences about author intentions 
online, a phenomenon consistent with theories of fiction that claim that authors of narrative 
are low in salience or even 'invisible' (Gerrig, 1993; Duchan, Bruder & Hewitt, 1995).  
A milder version of this claim might be that audiences of fiction are not just 
“observing bystanders” but rather communicative addressees that understand that the 'purpose' 
of a fictional story is limited to passing entertainment achieved by absorption into the story. 
By a pragmatic account of communication, if both the author and the addressee of the story 
agree on this one purpose as the only goal of the fiction exchange, no extra communicative 
devices or exchanges are necessary, and the common ground necessary for a successful  
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exchange is achieved (Clark, 1996), an exchange that is already communicative in nature. It 
may well be that entertainment through fiction requires, as a rule for the game or element of a 
cognitive schema, that the author self-efface and the audience pretend there is no author.  
Authors are, in this framework, ideally invisible manufacturers of artifacts then consumed for 
enjoyment (see Bordwell, 1985 for examples of how this applies to Classic Hollywood 
filmmaking). Audiences, in this framework, know that authors are likely to self-efface, and 
might even react negatively to excessive cues about authors within the story, but in no way 
can the initial communicative act be denied.  
The question still remains on whether communication through fiction can take 
different and more complex forms. The acknowledgment that author invisibility is a useful 
assumption when trying to achieve entertainment through fiction, and that it already fulfills a 
communicative function, should not lead to the conclusion that studying instances of more 
intense authorial visibility is irrelevant or unnecessary. Narratological traditions have long 
argued about the relevance of real authors to comprehension and interpretations of narratives. 
There is a recognition that audiences have some kind of author representation, but whether 
that representation is understood to be part of a fictional or real world is up to discussion and 
acknowledged as an empirically unexplored question (Bortolussi & Dixon, 2003). Other more 
radical traditions within narratology and literary criticism, insist that attempting to determine 
authorial intentions is a wrong way to deal with a text, and contributes nothing to literary 
interpretation (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1954). 
The notion that fiction is either not communicative, or communicative only in a very 
restricted sense, may make sense within narratology and literary criticism, but it has been 
strongly contested with several arguments within the field of communication. Some have 
argued that saying that fiction is not communicative assumes a limited understanding of 
communication, as existing only when there is a possibility of direct dialogue and exchange, 
that does not correspond with the variety of communicative contexts we know (Gerrig &  
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Horton, 2001).  Gibbs (1999, 2001) claims that the possibility of fiction being communication, 
particularly statements regarding audience‟s interpretations of authorial intentions, should be 
studied empirically. He provides a list of empirically unanswered questions in this area. Of 
specific interest to the proposal here, he suggests researching whether there are differences 
between online (while exposed to the story) and offline (after story exposure) processing of 
fiction, in the understanding that offline processing may be more likely to produce reflection 
on author‟s intentions; and exploring individual differences that readers may bring to 
incorporating author reflections when making meaning of texts (Gibbs, 2001).  
Indeed, offline processing of fictional content is likely to be the instance in which a 
number of relevant thoughts occur. When online, audiences are likely to be transported into 
the story world, which probably limits their affective and cognitive responses to story-world 
elements: plot, characters and setting. Once offline, audiences may be more likely (and able) 
to process overall meaning of the story to the  self and others, ponder connections of movie 
topics to real world issues, and reflect on authorial intentions. It is only when offline, too, that 
viewers have an actual possibility to enact communicative responses to the story, ranging from 
information seeking about the story to discussion of the story with others, and critical analyses 
or reviews of the story. In this study, participants were asked to list topics they would be likely 
to discuss with others after watching the film, and attempt to assess this offline form of 
thoughtfulness. This study also explores individual differences in the specific form of 
audiences‟ orientations towards movies.  
Audiences’ representations of narrators and authors 
Researchers have recently begun to investigate how readers construct mental 
representations of the narrators of stories. Although empirical research on the salience and role 
of pragmatic agents (such as narrators and authors) to readers is very scarce (Graesser, 
Bowers, Olde & Pomeroy, 1999), there is some evidence that non-character narrators are not 
completely invisible to fiction readers. Results of these studies show that information that is  
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marked by the narrator as important facilitates comprehension of the text and correct 
inferences about story outcomes (Mullins & Dixon, 2007), and that readers do keep track of 
story world information that is provided solely by an external narrator, (as opposed to by a 
story world character) even when the story is told in the third person (Graesser, Bowers, Olde 
& Pomeroy, 1999). This indicates that readers have, at least, a marginal awareness of even 
third person narrators, and that they are able to retrieve from memory the difference between 
story information provided by narrators and story information provided by characters. The 
evidence also shows that readers make some links between the story world and the producer of 
that story-world. One may speculate that, unless there is a voice-over, the hypothesis of zero 
memory for a narrator may hold when the story is in film format, where the author/narrator 
can become completely invisible (the illusion that we are observing events by ourselves), but 
there is no empirical research about this. 
  Besides being able to track authors as sources of story information, readers are able to 
make links between fiction authors and the real-world. Readers can make technical inferences 
about authors; for example, that they withhold information for suspense purposes, or that they 
overemphasize bits of information to confuse the reader temporarily by planting red herrings 
that make the story more challenging and enjoyable (Mullins & Dixon, 2007). Readers also 
show awareness of some ways authors blur distinctions between story worlds and the real 
world, for artistic reasons. A survey of fiction consumers shows that they agree with the 
statement that authors may invent facts that are inconsistent with the real world with the 
intention of enhancing their plots (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999; emphasis added). Although this 
result comes from a survey of only 29 undergraduate students, it shows an interesting 
understanding of how real-world facts, fictional facts, and authorial intentions are connected, 
and it is one of very few measurements of perceived author intention found in the empirically 
based literature. According to Prentice, this awareness should have effects on processing of 
fiction. Readers, inferring the intentions of authors (aesthetic/functional rather than persuasive  
24 
or informative), will process information less systematically, since it is not supposed to 
connect to the real world. In the empirical test of this notion, readers of narratives did process 
factual stories more systematically than fictional ones, as evidenced by the stories labeled as 
factual having less of an impact on their real world beliefs than the ones labeled as fictional 
(Prentice & Bailis, 1995).   
This body of research labors under the assumption that just as readers create models 
of space, time and causality within the story world, they create mental representations of 
narrators' knowledge, perspective and goals, and that readers “cooperate with the narrator 
interpreting characters and events in the story world in a way that makes the narrator's stance 
rational and justified” (Dixon & Bortolussi, 1996, p.405). However, as is the case with all the 
mental model research, these studies explore solely how narrator cues help readers construct 
more accurate representations of the story world (Do they help readers solve the mystery in 
the story? Do they help them know what character knows more or less information?), or 
choose an appropriate attitude towards the story (tolerate momentary uncertainty, tolerate 
ambiguity). This research does not address whether or how readers make inferences about the 
author‟s having a purpose or message that transcends the story world and may be connected to 
the real world. Thus, although this research extends our knowledge of author representations 
by addressing the effects of narrator cues on online story processing, it still lies within the 
paradigm of research in cognitive processing of narratives, a paradigm that identifies an 
accurate representation of the story world as the sole relevant goal of the narrative 
viewing/reading experience. 
From a narratological perspective (Herman & Vervaeck, 2001), the research reported 
above deals with the level of the story, or story world (plot, setting, characters) and/or with the 
level of the narrative structure (order of presentation of events, focus of attention, 
characterization). However, they neglect the level of the narration, this is, the level that 
addresses the fact that the story is told by someone in a certain context, most likely with a  
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certain purpose. The level of narration explores the ways in which authors appear (or not) to 
the audience, what are the purposes of the storytelling, what stance they take –if any, towards 
the story‟s events, and what are the limits between the story world and the author‟s world. An 
analysis of the narration level examines, for example, under what conditions a character's 
words may be considered to represent opinions of the author (an issue known as the problem 
of voicing, originally addressed by Russian literary critic Bakhtin in 1929). Finally, the 
narration level deals with the way in which the authorial purpose in telling a story is -or not- 
perceived by the audience, or achieved. As I have indicated earlier, this level of storytelling is 
empirically under-researched. 
Author thoughts, moral evaluations and ambiguity 
There is some evidence that viewers do have spontaneous thoughts about fiction 
authors. For example, when asked to list the thoughts they were having while watching an 
episode of crime drama, although the majority of thoughts were about the story-world itself,  
viewers still produced a considerable amount of thoughts about actors and producers of the 
show (Wilson & Busselle, 2004). In a content analysis of people‟s informal reviews of films 
online, utterances about authors made the plurality (43%) of thoughts coded (Barriga & 
Shapiro, 2007). Many of these comments were technical in nature (i.e. “The director does not 
know how to use flashbacks properly”), which is consistent with an aesthetic/functional 
perception of author intent and its relations with the story as artifact. However, there were also 
a number of thoughts about the relationship between moral content in the movie and moral 
attributions to the authors. Of all the thoughts regarding moral issues, 31% were about authors 
(directors and producers), and  these mostly consisted of evaluations (positive or negative) 
about the way in which the authors dealt with morality, many times involving judgments of 
intentions (i.e. “ this film attempts to act as this leftist critique on capital punishment”)  and 
sometimes even contrasting authorial intentions with effectiveness (i.e. “This film cleverly 
tries, and in my opinion succeeds, to make a statement about the moralities and faults of  
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corporal punishment”; “If the filmmakers wanted to  underscore the danger of a system that 
puts to death innocent people...then the film...fails to deliver”). Thus, there is at least some 
evidence that people can think about author intentions and their accomplishment, and that 
such thoughts are not particularly infrequent when the domain of the discussion is moral and 
when audiences are thinking about a story offline.  
One would expect such offline thoughts about a story to appear especially when the 
way in which the story is told is unexpected, since the reader or viewer needs to elaborate an 
inference as to why the author would not be clearer (Clarke, 1996, in line with the Gricean 
principle of cooperation), or, in the specific case of narrative, why the author would break the 
traditional narrative schema. Ambiguity, especially unresolved one, is disliked by audiences 
(Comisky & Bryant, 1982) and it may make audiences more likely to engage in thoughts 
about authors, whether it is to criticize their craftsmanship, or to question their intentions. 
Moral ambiguity in stories can be enjoyable but requires more cognitive engagement from 
audiences, and it is possible that this engagement leads to more thoughts about authors, 
especially if the story –like a film, is expected to reach a large audience, a factor that, as we 
have seen, sensitizes people to hostile view points and concern for the real world effects of 
fiction. Thus, our hypothesis 
H13:  Film clips with morally ambiguous characters will be more likely than those 
with morally unambiguous characters to elicit thoughts about the authors. 
H14:  Participants who watch morally ambiguous movie clips will be more likely than 
those who watch morally unambiguous clips to want to seek author related 
information.   
Author thoughts and enjoyment orientations 
Affective and cognitive processing occur not only in response to the story world‟s plot 
and characters, but also in response to the formal features of the narrative. (Oatley, 2004), 
proposes that some emotions associated with reading stories are unrelated to the plot or  
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characters, and should be considered as “external” to the text, such as the pleasure produced 
by reading, curiosity, and surprise at unfamiliar elements
1. Such emotional responses to formal 
features of a story have been labeled “artifact emotions”, both in the case of written text 
(Kneepens & Zwaan, 1994) and film (Tan, 1994, 1996), and they include interest, wonder, and 
enjoyment at the completion of formal patterns. Although the authors do not discuss them in 
terms of cognition and affect, it seems clear that these gratifying affective responses arise from 
cognitive engagement with the artifact (i.e., curiosity, puzzle solving, and completion of 
patterns). Aesthetic feelings have been found to appear specifically in response to formal 
features of text (Miall & Kuiken, 1994), and, in those cases, reading time is slowed (another 
sign of cognitive engagement) and readers report higher levels of uncertainty about story 
content. Readers tend to stop the activity of merely “decoding text” when they come across a 
particularly well crafted or stylish passage, and this stopping moment leads then to reflection, 
introspection and interpretation (da Costa Fialho, 2007). 
Eudaimonic motivation may have a key role in producing appreciation of fiction as an 
artifact, since artifact emotions and cognitions are highly likely to require audiences to 
continue processing a narrative after the viewing/reading experience is over. Artifact emotions 
have been proposed and shown to prompt complex cognitive responses, such as reflection on 
and re-structuration of the schemata for stories. (Miall, 1989), finds that, for literary 
narratives, readers use affective and emotional responses to decide which elements in the text 
are important to interpretation and which are not, but they do this only in a second reading of 
the story. Readers attributed importance to sentences that appeared as superfluous background 
or ornate artsy detail at first, because the overall affective mood of the story indicated that 
those sentences had symbolic or foreboding value. However, this shift only occurred in a 
                                                           
1  A reader, for example, could be surprised to find explanatory footnotes throughout a fictional 
novel of the fantasy genre, such as “Jonathan Strange & Mr. Norrell”, by Susanna Clarke, or many 
of Jorge Luis Borges's short stories.   
28 
second reading of the story. In his study he used a literary text (a story by Virginia Wolff) that 
presented levels of uncertainty and vagueness that are not typical of the traditional story 
schema, such as multiple, indeterminate, and even conflictive goals for one character. When 
the schematic expectations that readers have about stories are thus violated, artifact emotions, 
such as curiosity and surprise lead the reader to engage in re-structuration of the story schema, 
which includes incorporating new information about the genre of the story, and the possible 
ways of engaging with it and enjoying it.  This task, that involves arousal and relief, creates its 
own kind of pleasure for the reader, even while producing longer reading times and temporary 
uncertainty. To the extent that audiences are engaged not only with the story world, but also 
with elements of the narrative structures, they can be considered to be engaging in thoughtful 
extra-narrative processing, this is, the kind of processing necessary to engage in thoughts or 
representations of story authors. In this study, thoughts about story structure and genre are 
considered a form of authorial thought as well, because they imply awareness of the story as a 
crafted message.  
  In order to engage in processing about a story‟s author, audience members necessarily 
have to go beyond the limits of the story world, and present what Zwaan (1992) calls a 
“literary attitude” -a readiness to construct the goals of the narrator and the point of the text 
when these are not self evident. A literary attitude requires some cognitive effort that goes 
beyond the usual processing necessary to comprehend a text while reading, and it is 
reasonable to expect that audiences oriented to thoughtful eudaimonic appreciation be more 
likely to engage in it than those oriented to hedonic gratification. 
Hedonically oriented audiences are unlikely to engage in thoughts about authors 
because, if they were to occur online, they would bring them out of a state of transportation, 
which is key to hedonic enjoyment; and, on the other hand, hedonically oriented audiences are 
not motivated to offline processing of movies. According to (Oatley, 2004), transportation is 
at one pole of the spectrum of roles for stories, offering escape, a pleasurable use of time, and  
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no ambiguities in story structure –the other pole being a transformative, reflective function. 
Transportation is characterized by complete submersion into the story world, to the extent that 
audiences forget the world around them (Green et al., 2004), become less critical and process 
information in the story less systematically  (Green & Brock, 2000, 2002) and have no access 
to the voice of authors of the story (Gerrig, 1993). Indeed, a self-effacing author is often listed 
as one of the characteristics of traditional and enjoyable fictional story-telling (Bordwell, 
1985; Richard Gerrig, 1993; Tan, 1996), serving to maintain the reader within the realm of the 
story world. For example, because readers who are fully transported into the story are less 
aware of authorial intentions, they  process messages at face value (M. D. Slater, 2002; M. D. 
Slater & Rouner, 2003)  and are more persuadable  because they feel their free will less 
threatened by a potentially manipulative sender (Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, & Voulodakis, 
2002; Worchel & Brehm, 1970). Even for some controversial ideologically and morally 
charged issues, narrative drama can minimize processing of the story as intentionally 
persuasive discourse (M. Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006), -although this only held true for 
death penalty as an issue, not for gay marriage. It would seem that unless an issue is really 
salient ideologically, transported audiences will fail to engage in a critical approach to 
authorial intention. 
Engaging in thoughts about a story‟s author requires that the audience member either 
disengage from complete absorption in the story world while processing the story, and engage 
in thoughts about the author (online processing), or be transported into the story world while 
viewing, but engage in thoughts about the author after he/she is done processing the story 
(offline processing). As we have seen, the first option is difficult, and it is more likely that 
thoughtful processing of authors occurs offline, if ever. This prediction would also be 
consistent with results showing that foregrounding of style and authorship are likely to make 
people engage in interpretation and reflection on second reading of a story (Miall, 1989) -this 
is, once it is clear to the reader that clarifications or disambiguations are not provided at the  
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story's closure. For this reason, in this study measurement of author thoughts will be focused 
on offline processing.  
In both cases, however, audiences oriented eudaimonically are more likely than 
audiences oriented hedonically to engage in any kind of thoughtful process, including thoughts 
about authorial intentions and authorial technical accomplishments or failings (judgments of 
the success of assumed technical intentions). Hedonically oriented audiences are not likely to 
engage in effortful thinking that distracts from movie enjoyment, or in thoughts that require 
them to remember and/or revisit the movie. Thus we predict a main effect of movie enjoyment 
orientation on author thoughts, such that participants high in eudaemonic orientation will be 
more likely to express unprompted author thoughts than those high in hedonic orientations. In 
this case, the hypothesis only refers to the single orientation groups (Eudaimonic and 
Hedonic). There is no previous research that can support a hypothesis for the way dual 
oriented participants may behave: their eudaimonic motivation might lead to more author 
thoughts, but their hedonic motivation might discourage them from abandoning the 
pleasurable effect of transportation.  
H15:  Exclusively eudaimonically oriented viewers (Eudaimonic) will be more likely 
than exclusively hedonically oriented viewers (Hedonic) to report thoughts about film 
authors. (Main effect of movie enjoyment orientation on author thoughts) 
It is also likely that the differences between eudaemonic and hedonic responses to 
fiction appear more clearly when the movie clip is ambiguous, as eudaimonics may be more 
motivated to respond to the cognitive challenge offered by moral uncertainty whereas 
hedonics may be more likely to respond reluctantly to the challenge.  
H16:  The difference between eudaimonically oriented viewers (Eudaimonic) and 
hedonically oriented viewers (Hedonic) in thoughts about authors will be larger when 
movies are ambiguous than when they are unambiguous. (Interaction effect of moral 
ambiguity and movie enjoyment orientation on author thoughts)  
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These expected differences in spontaneous expression of author thoughts are likely to 
be even greater if participants are directly asked whether they are interested or willing to seek 
further information about authors regarding their intent in producing the movie. Again, we 
would expect high eudaimonics to be more willing to seek and explore author information 
than high hedonics, and we would expect this willingness to engage with author information 
to be the highest when the movie is ambiguous. Thus, we predict the same pattern. 
H17: Exclusively eudaimonically oriented viewers (Eudaimonic) will be more willing 
than exclusively hedonically oriented viewers (Hedonic) to want to seek author 
related information. (Main effect of movie enjoyment orientation on willingness to 
explore author information). 
H18: The difference between eudaimonically oriented viewers (Eudaimonic) and 
hedonically oriented viewers (Hedonic) in willingness to explore author information 
will be larger when movies are ambiguous than when they are unambiguous. 
(Interaction effect of moral ambiguity and movie enjoyment orientation on willingness 
to explore author information) 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHOD 
Design 
The study is structured as a multiple message (4 movie clips) between-subjects quasi-
experimental design, with one manipulated independent variable (Morality: 
Ambiguous/Unambiguous) and one measured independent variable (Movie Enjoyment 
Orientation: Dual/Hedonic/Eudaimonic/Low). Tolerance for ambiguity is used as a covariate 
in final analyses.  
Stimuli Material 
The fictional narratives were presented as four 6 to 7 minute long video clips that 
summarize full length feature films. The four movies used were House of Sand and Fog 
(HSF), 21 grams (TOG), 25
th Hour (TFH) and We don’t live here anymore (WDL).  Each of 
the four selected movies focused on a male character‟s actions, whose behavior could be 
edited into the two experimental versions. In the unambiguous version, the clip was 
constructed so that the target character was consistently bad – he was only shown engaging in 
morally reprehensible actions. In the ambiguous version, the target character is portrayed 
doing exactly the same bad things but he is also shown engaging in morally desirable 
behaviors. This manipulation created ambiguous versions that were longer than the 
unambiguous versions. This problem was ameliorated by introducing some neutral content in 
the unambiguous versions –for example, a scene where a character rides away in a bike would 
have a longer section of him riding into the distance, or a scene that takes place in a forest 
would have longer initial pan of the forest setting without any actions taking place. These 
alterations were minimal in terms of each scene in the clip, and are not likely to have made 
one version significantly slower paced, or more boring than the other.  
Each film addressed different kinds of immoral behaviors, including violence towards 
women, emotional abuse, greed, violent behavior, drug dealing, encouragement of sex with  
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minors, racism, homicide, breaking of medical privacy laws, infidelity. Positive moral 
behaviors in the ambiguous version included caring and protection of family members, 
forgiveness, restraint in the use of violence, charity towards strangers, helping adversaries, 
recognizing flaws, sincere apologizing, and good parenting. 
Participants  
  Participants were 154 undergraduates at a large northeastern university who agreed to 
receive credit in their classes in exchange for their participation in the study. Students were 
recruited for the study using SUSAN, an online automated system that offers a variety of 
opportunities for students to participate in campus social science research. The announcement 
of the study in the SUSAN website indicated that it was a study in which people would have 
to answer a brief questionnaire about their movie preferences online, and attend a lab session 
at a later time, where they would watch brief movies and answer questions about them.  
  Participants included 122 women and 32 men. Ages ranged from 18 to 25, with 20 
years being the average age. Since sex of the participant was not a variable of interest in any 
of the study‟s hypotheses, no special effort was made to obtain a more balanced gender 
distribution.  
Procedure 
The study took place in two separate sessions. In the first session, which took place 
online, participants were directed to an online survey website (Checkbox, Cornell University‟s 
secure  preferred online survey system at the time) in which they reviewed and accepted a 
consent form, and then responded to a 12 item questionnaire regarding their movie 
preferences. Participants were then instructed to sign up for a lab session to take place at least 
two days after their participation in the online survey. Ideally, students would have 
participated in the second session two to three days after responding the online survey. In 
reality, because of student scheduling and rescheduling issues, time between the online survey 
and the lab session varied more broadly, but most participants (82%) completed the lab  
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session between two to four days after taking the online survey. 8% of the students attended 
the lab session the day after completing the survey, and the rest of the participants took more 
than four days between the survey and the lab session. No student was allowed to participate 
in the lab session the same day as they had completed the survey. Since the goal of the delay 
between both was only to discourage participants from evaluating movies in agreement with 
their memory of survey preferences, longer intervals of delay were not considered particularly 
problematic.  
For the second session, participants were randomly assigned to watch movies in either 
the ambiguous versions (characters did good and bad actions) or the unambiguous versions 
(characters did only bad things). Participants were also randomly assigned to one of four 
orders of presentation of the films (a Latin square was used to create four orders such that no 
movie was preceded by the same other movie in any order). Participants were then directed to 
a computer station. The computer presented participants with all of the study‟s instructions, 
video stimuli and questionnaires, through MediaLab software interface (Empirisoft, 2008). 
After reading the instructions, participants proceeded to watch the first of four 6-8 minute long 
movie clips. After each movie clip, participants were asked to evaluate their experience with 
the clip in several ways. First, they listed thoughts regarding issues they would discuss with 
friends if they were to talk about the movie they just saw.  Next, participants evaluated the 
movie they had just seen using Likert scale items and Semantic Differential items. After 
completing these questions, participants proceeded to the next movie clip and went through 
the process again. This sequence was repeated until participants had watched all four movie 
clips and responded to four sets of Thought Listing, Likert Scale items and Semantic 
Differential Items.  
After watching all four target clips, participants went on to the next stage in the study. 
At this stage, participants answered, for each movie clip they had seen, a series of questions 
intended to measure their interest in knowing more about the movie‟s authors, and their moral  
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and technical evaluations of the authors of each clip. Throughout this stage, participants were 
shown a head shot of the target character as a reminder of each clip.  
In the third and final stage of the study, participants responded to a series of items 
unrelated to the movies they had seen. These items corresponded to two scales: an Abstract 
Thinking scale, to test for differences in abstract thinking that the movies might have 
prompted, and a Tolerance for Ambiguity scale (Budner, 1960), to measure individual 
differences in tolerance to ambiguity that might have an effect on participants‟ responses to 
the moral ambiguity in the clip. After finishing this stage, participants responded a few last 
demographic questions (sex, age), and read a short debriefing statement summarizing the 
goals of the study. They were then thanked for their participation, offered the opportunity to 
ask further questions about the study, and let go. 
Measurement of Hedonic and Eudaimonic Orientations 
The questionnaire that participants answered online was a 12 item scale (Oliver & 
Raney, 2008) used to assess participants‟ orientations towards movie enjoyment. The items 
are in the form of statements that participants rate in a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 
Strongly Disagree, to 7 = Strongly Agree. Six of the items measure hedonic motivations (“It is 
important to me that I have fun when watching a movie”;”Movies that make me laugh are 
among my favorite”; “I find that even simple movies can be enjoyable as long as they are 
fun”; “I like movies that may be considered silly or shallow if they can make me laugh and 
have a good time”; “For me, the best movies are the ones that are entertaining”;“My favorite 
kind of movies are happy and positive”). The other six statements detect eudaimonic 
motivations (“I like movies that challenge my way of seeing the world”; “I like movies that 
make me more reflective”, “I like movies that focus on meaningful human conditions”; “I am 
very moved by movies that are about people’s search for greater understanding in life”; “My 
favorite kinds of movies are ones that make me think”; “I like movies that have profound 
meaning or messages to convey”).  
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A principal components analysis of the 12 items using a VARIMAX rotation initially 
identified 3 components with Eigenvalues above 1. The first component (Eigenvalue = 3.94) 
corresponded exactly to the 6 eudaimonic orientation items taken from Oliver & Raney 
(2008), with item loadings ranging from .56 to .82. This component accounted for 32% of 
variance in the scores. The second component (Eigenvalue = 2.14) grouped two items of the 
expected hedonic set (loads of .68 and.77), explaining 17.8% of score variance, and the third 
component (Eigenvalue = 1.15) grouped the remaining four expected hedonic items (loadings 
range from .51 to .78), explaining 9.8% of the variance. An examination of the items in 
components 2 and 3 did not provide an easy interpretation for the distinct components; in fact, 
some of the items had similar loadings in both components. The six expected items in the 
hedonic group were finally grouped as one single scale for a number of reasons. First, it 
corresponded to theoretical expectations whereas there was no good distinct interpretation of 
components 2 and 3. Second, the Eigenvalue for component 3 (1.15) indicates that this third 
factor adds little variance over what would be explained by single items. Third, an 
examination of the scree plot, an alternative criterion that can be used to determine the 
appropriate number of factors to accept, indicates a leveling beginning at the point of the third 
component, indicating that a two component solution is appropriate.  
As confirmation, a principal component analysis of the 12 items was run forcing two 
factors. The solution indicates that the first component comprises the items expected to 
measure Eudaimonic Orientation, with loadings ranging from .66 to .82, whereas the second 
component comprises the items expected to measure Hedonic Orientation, with loadings 
ranging from .48 to .72. Total variance explained by these two components is 50.7%.  
The mean of each group of 6 items was used to produce two continuous scales 
measuring „Eudaimonic Orientation‟ and „Hedonic Orientation‟. Reliability measures for both 
scales are good (Cronbach‟s α .83 for the Eudaimonic scale and .75 for the Hedonic scale). 
The median of these scales (Eudaimonic = 5.42, Hedonic = 5.50) was used to create another  
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pair of measures, dividing the participants in “High” and “Low” Eudaimonic and Hedonic 
orientations. Finally, a measure of overall enjoyment orientations combined these two groups 
into four categories of movie enjoyment orientations: dual orientation (high hedonic, high 
eudaimonic: 31 participants); eudaimonic orientation (high eudaimonic, low hedonic: 46 
participants); hedonic orientation (high hedonic, low eudaimonic: 45 participants) and low 
(low hedonic, low eudaimonic: 32 participants). The distribution of participants in the groups 
is consistent with the idea that hedonic and eudaimonic motivations are distinct: the two 
largest groups were high in only one of the measures. However, more than 40 percent of the 
participants fell into the dual or low groups, which may indicate that the presence of combined 
patterns of motivations towards movie enjoyment  are common. This four-category variable 
for movie enjoyment orientation is the one used in the hypotheses testing models. Using the 
categorized version of the continuous variables allowed a more direct way to enter and 
interpret of the variables in the repeated measures ANOVA model required by the design. Use 
of the two scales (and their interaction term) as covariates in the model could have increased 
statistical power, but it also would have made interpretation of the results more cumbersome. 
When statistical tests were run using the continuous variables (and their interaction term) as 
covariates in the model, the pattern of results regarding the variables of interest was essentially 
the same. 
Covariate 
Overall tolerance for ambiguity was measured with a 16 item scale (Budner, 1962), 
with the items operationalizing tolerance to ambiguity in three ways: tolerance to novel 
information, complexity and insolubility. Although the literature provides a number of scales 
that measure intolerance to ambiguity, the Budner scale is the most used in social science 
research to date (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005), even though its internal reliability 
tends to be lower than desirable, as is the case in this instance as well. Cronbach‟s α was .62, a 
measure of reliability that could not be increased by eliminating items from the scale. This  
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scale was used as a covariate in hypotheses testing, to control for the effect of individual 
differences in tolerance to ambiguity on enjoyment and evaluation of the film clips.  
Thought List Coding 
  The first question that participants faced after viewing each movie clip was “Please 
think for a moment about the clip you just saw. Imagine a situation where you are talking to 
some friends about this movie. What kinds of things do you think you would talk about?” 
Participants were offered the possibility to write down five separate thoughts per movie, but 
were not forced to fill all five slots. Thus, the maximum number of thoughts that could be 
obtained per movie was 770. The actual number of thoughts produced was 617 for House of 
Sand and Fog, 593 for 25
th Hour, 617 for 21 Grams and 588 for We Don’t Live Here 
Anymore. Total number of thoughts recorded was 2415.  
The thought list provides a measure of issues that participants spontaneously 
(undirected by questions) considered worthy of discussion. These thoughts were coded by the 
experimenter and an assistant coder unacquainted with the study’s hypotheses. Thoughts 
were coded into categories of interest to the study’s hypotheses, as listed below, and for 
some categories for which there were no hypotheses, but that could provide relevant 
information for post-hoc results interpretation. A randomly selected subset of 520 thoughts 
(21.5% of all thoughts) was coded by both the experimenter and the assistant coder in order to 
obtain measures of inter-coder agreement. The variables and categories that thoughts were 
coded for and their respective inter-coder agreement statistics are reported below.  
Morality. Each thought was coded for presence or absence of moral themes. To be 
coded as moral, a thought had to refer explicitly to at least one of a set of morally charged 
words (ethical/unethical, justice/injustice, fair/unfair, right/wrong, values, care, compassion, 
morality/immorality, good/bad, should/shouldn‟t). The coding criterion for moral presence 
was strict, and it was intended to bias the coding of moral presence towards thoughts that were 
explicit in their reference to morality, guaranteeing that the participant was considering the  
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issue from a moral perspective. Thus, some thoughts that at first sight seem to clearly imply a 
moral dimension (i.e. “racism”, “violence against women”) are not coded as moral, unless 
accompanied by an explicit moral indicator as listed above. A participant, when saying “the 
movie was about racism” may be only descriptive, and may not be engaging in a moral 
perspective. Table 1 below provides the criteria used in the coding of this variable, with 
characteristic examples taken from the data set. Inter-coder percent agreement on this variable 
using Krippendorff‟s α, a conservative measure for inter-coder agreement which accounts for 
agreement by chance, was.78. Typical recommendations for alpha levels indicate that levels 
above .67 can be used to draw tentative conclusions, and those above .80 can be relied on 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Morality and emotion (see below) can be difficult variables to code, and 
the reliability levels achieved are not completely reliable, but they are good enough to use for 
tentative conclusions. 
Emotion thoughts. Thoughts were coded for presence or absence of reference to 
emotions. References to emotional states of the viewer, the characters or others were coded as 
thoughts referring to emotion (see Table 2 below for coding criteria and examples). Inter-
coder agreement for presence of emotion was Krippendorff‟s α = .70.  
Valence. Valence of thoughts was coded as positive, negative or neutral. It is 
important to clarify that valence does not correspond exactly to emotional valence. For 
example, a thought such as “the scene with the cops was badly written” was coded as 
negative, as it clearly implies a negative evaluation of the movie. It does not, however, convey 
any emotion. This variable gives a sense of positive or negative reactions across a spectrum of 
dimensions, not only an affective dimension. Krippendorff‟s α for this variable was .79.  
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Table 1. Coding criteria for moral/non-moral thoughts 
 
Categories  Criteria  Examples 
 
Moral 
 
 
Explicit reference to morality. 
Includes explicit reference to any 
of the following concepts: 
 
Right/wrong 
Ethical/Unethical 
Justice/Injustice 
Fair/Unfair 
Values 
Compassion/Care 
Morality/Immorality 
Good/Bad actions 
Good/Bad people 
“Should do/Should have done” 
 
“That was so unfair” 
 
“He should have sold the house back 
instead of being so greedy” 
 
“The movie is about our changing 
values as a culture” 
 
“I thought Monty was bad but then I 
changed my mind” 
 
“At least the character showed some 
compassion when he did not kill the 
man who betrayed him” 
 
Non-moral 
 
Statements not including the 
criteria above.   
 
Specifically, issues that may have 
moral implications or connotations 
(i.e. Racism, domestic violence, 
infidelity, stereotypes), but are not 
explicit in their moral frame. 
 
Statements that use “good/bad” or 
any other of the above terms in a 
clearly non moral way. 
 
“I liked this movie even though it 
made me cry” 
 
“The movie is about racism in our 
society” 
 
“X is such a good actor” 
 
“She was using the wrong dress for 
her body type” 
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Table 2. Coding criteria for emotion thoughts 
 
Variable 
Categories  Criteria  Examples 
 
Emotion 
 
 
Consideration of character‟s 
emotions 
 
Expression of emotional reactions 
to the story 
 
-Expressions of empathy, 
sympathy, understanding. 
 
-Comments on the emotional 
impact of the film on the viewer, 
level of emotional involvement 
achieved, emotional interjections. 
 
“She must have been really angry at 
losing her house like that.” 
 
“I was sad when I saw those poor 
children.” 
 
“I can see how it would feel to meet 
the love of your life after you are 
married.” 
 
“Oh, no!” 
 
“Depressing” 
 
 
Non-emotion 
 
Any comment that does not 
express emotion 
 
Comments regarding boredom or 
entertainment levels. 
 
Comments evaluating the quality 
of the movie only. 
 
“That was slow and boring” 
 
“I really liked this movie clip, I 
would recommend it to my friends” 
 
 
 
    
42 
Table 3. Coding criteria for thought valence 
 
Variable 
Categories  Criteria  Examples 
 
Positive 
 
 
An explicit or implicit positive 
evaluation, opinion, judgment or 
emotion. 
 
 
“This movie was great” 
 
“I liked the way in which he 
portrayed the female characters” 
 
“I was happy when the character 
was nice to the dog” 
 
Negative 
 
An explicit or implicit negative 
evaluation, opinion, judgment or 
emotion. 
 
“I don’t think the film captures the 
real dynamics of drug dealing” 
 
“It was boring”. 
 
“So sad” 
 
Neutral 
 
A neutrally valenced statement. 
 
A question or statement in which a 
final judgment of valence is 
undetermined. 
 
“The colonel wanted to sell the house 
for four times the value he bought it 
for.” 
 
 “I couldn’t decide if I loved or hated 
the character” 
 
Narrative and Extra-narrative thoughts. Thoughts were coded for reference to the 
story plot and characters (narrative thoughts) vs. thoughts for extra-narrative dimensions. 
There were four categories of extra-narrative thoughts: thoughts about the movie actors (actor 
thoughts), thoughts about the participant themselves and people they might discuss the movie 
with (self thoughts) thoughts about movie topics and themes but without reference to the 
movie plot or characters (world thoughts), and thoughts about movie authors, directors and 
writers (author thoughts). Krippendorff‟s α for this variable was .98.  
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Table 4. Coding Criteria for Narrative/Extra-narrative thoughts 
 
Variable 
Categories  Criteria  Examples 
 
Narrative         
      Narrative 
 
 
 
Refers to movie‟s plot, setting, 
characters. 
 
 
 
“I wondered if he was going to choose 
the woman or stay with the children.” 
 
Extra-narrative      
       Self 
 
Refers to the commenter 
him/herself, or others associated to 
him/her in the situation of the 
movie, or regarding movie themes.  
 
 
“We would discuss whether we would do 
the same in that situation” 
 
“I don’t know if I could forgive my 
husband for that” 
 
      Actors  Refers to movie‟s actors. 
 
“Edward Norton is awesome.” 
      World  Refers to movie‟s themes, taking 
them beyond the limits of the 
movie plot, considering them as 
“real world” issues. 
 
“Racism and Prejudice” 
 
“The character is a good example of 
how little human beings know about 
each other” 
 
      Author  Explicit or implicit references to 
the writers, directors, creators of 
the movie.  
 
Technical descriptions or 
evaluations of the movie‟s 
features, including its genre. 
“The scene with the DEA cops was 
badly written.” 
 
“I am not sure what was the point of this 
movie.” 
 
“It’s just another typical melodrama.” 
 
Interrogative thoughts. Thoughts were also coded for presence or absence of 
interrogative intent. Thoughts that explicitly asked questions or expressed uncertainty or 
curiosity were coded as manifesting an interrogative intent. Intercoder agreement for this 
variable was Krippendorff‟s α = .92.  
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Table 5. Coding criteria for interrogative thoughts 
 
Variable 
Categories  Criteria  Examples 
 
Interrogative 
 
 
Questions, presence of question 
mark 
 
Expression of uncertainty, 
curiosity, indecisiveness about a 
character or issue. 
 
 
. 
 
 
“Why would he not give back the 
house? 
 
“I did not understand why she would 
commit suicide over that problem” 
 
“I am not sure you are allowed to 
check for the origin of a transplant 
organ” 
 
“I wonder what happened to the 
kids” 
 
 
 
Non-interrogative 
 
Statements, descriptions, 
evaluations, judgments.  
 
Single words 
 
Expressions of  emotion, shock. 
 
 
 
“That was slow and boring” 
 
 
“Sadness” 
 
“Oh no!” 
 
Dependent Measures 
Movie Clip Evaluations. Participants evaluated the movie clips by stating their 
level of agreement with five statements on a 6-point scale (1= Strongly Disagree, 6 = 
Strongly Agree). These statements were created avoiding phrasing that would 
correspond to clearly hedonic or eudaimonic orientations, and they act as a measure of 
general preference or liking for the clips. The items are: I liked this movie clip; This is 
the kind of movie I tend to prefer over others; This is the kind of movie I often watch; I  
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would like to watch more of this movie; If this movie were based on a book, I would 
like to read it.  
These statements were presented to the participants after the viewing of each 
movie clip. In order to determine if the five statements constitute a reliable scale based 
on a single factor, four separate principal component analyses and four separate 
reliability analyses were run (one per movie). Results of these analyses showed a 
similar pattern in all four cases. The Principal Component Analyses using Varimax 
rotations resulted in one component solutions for all four cases. Variance explained by 
this one component was, by movie: HSF = 76. 5%; TOG = 75.8%; TFH = 70.7%; 
WDL =73.5%. Reliability was high for the 5 item scales across all movies 
(Cronbach‟s α HSF = .92; TOG = .92; TFH = .89; WDL = .91). 
The mean of the 5 items was used to create a „Movie Evaluation‟ scale for each 
of the movie clips, in which high values correspond to positive movie evaluations. 
This is the measure used in the analyses reported below. 
Character Evaluations. Participants evaluated characters in several ways. A set 
of thirteen 6-point Likert scale items, some of them adapted from Raney (2002) and 
others created ad hoc for this study, asked participants to evaluate the characters. This 
set of questions intended to address several forms of evaluation: a cognitive 
evaluation, related to the interest that the character elicits, an affective evaluation, 
measuring whether the character would be likeable in “real life”, and a moral 
evaluation, intended to be used as a manipulation check.  
The 4 items intended to measure cognitive liking were I find the main 
character fascinating; I am interested in the main character; I would like to know 
more about the main character; The main character is engaging to watch. Internal 
reliability for this scale was consistently high across the four movies (Cronbach‟s α  
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HSF=.89, TOG = .89, TFH = .89, WDL = .90). The mean of the four items was used 
to create a “cognitive liking” scale for each of the movies. 
The 3 items intended to measure affective evaluations of the character were I 
would enjoy talking to the main character; I would like to know someone like the main 
character; I would like to be friends with the main character”. Again, reliability for 
these scales was high across all movies (Cronbach‟s α HSF = .88, TOG = .85, TFH = 
.82, WDL = .84). The mean of the three items was used to create an “affective liking” 
scale for each of the four movies. 
The 4 items measuring moral evaluations were: I think the character is a good 
person; I think the character is immoral (reverse coded); I think the character is likely 
to do the right thing in the future; I would trust the character. Internal reliability for 
this scale was overall lower than those in the other two scales, but still acceptable 
(Cronbach‟s α HSF = .89, TOG = .82, TFH = .76, WDL = .75). The mean of the four 
items was used to create a “moral evaluation” scale for each of the movies, intended to 
check the morality manipulation.  
Two extra items were included in the character evaluation set. One of them “I 
like the main character” acts as an overall measure of liking. Another item “I think the 
main character is complex” acts as an additional manipulation check for ambiguity of 
the character. 
Author Evaluations. A different set of Likert scale items was presented to 
participants after they had watched all movie clips. This set of 13 items measured 
evaluations of the movie‟s authors rather than the characters.  
A set of 4 items measured whether participants thought the film authors were 
technically good at their craft (I think the writer of this film is good at his/her job; I 
think the director of this film is good at his/her job; I think the actors in this film are 
good at their job; I think this film is technically good). Internal reliability for this scale  
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was high across all four movies (Cronbach‟s α HSF = .92, TOG = .88, TFH = .86, 
WDL = .90). The mean of the four items was used to create a measure of “technical 
evaluation” of movie authors. 
A set of 4 items measured whether participants were interested in engaging or 
seeking information about the movie authors (I would like to read an article about the 
writers’ and director’s intentions in making this movie; I would like to read an article 
about the actor’s experience while shooting this film; I would like to read an interview 
to the main actor focusing on this film; I would like to read an interview of the film’s 
director). Internal reliability for this scale was high across all four movies (Cronbach‟s 
α HSF = .85, TOG = .89, TFH = .83, WDL = .88). The mean of the four items was 
used to create a measure of participants‟ “author engagement”. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
  Because of the repeated measures design, checking the manipulation for moral 
ambiguity was challenging. Asking participants directly whether they thought the characters 
behaved in morally ambiguous ways would have very clearly directed them to think in terms 
of the manipulation, at a time when they still had to be exposed to more stimulus messages. It 
was decided not to ask directly about moral ambiguity, but to inquire about the morality of the 
character in the context of other character evaluation items (presented in random order), and, 
in addition, to ask whether the character was perceived as “complex”. Because ambiguity was 
manipulated by making one set of characters engage only in bad actions, and the other in both 
good and bad actions, we would expect the moral evaluations for the ambiguous versions to be 
higher than the ones in the unambiguous versions. This is evidence that the good actions 
presented only in the ambiguous clips were perceived. Additionally, characters that do both 
good and bad things are expected to be perceived as more “complex” than characters that do 
only bad things. Thus, the manipulation check for complexity is a second indication that a 
difference in moral character was perceived. Together, both manipulation checks give a sense 
of whether participants perceived the moral ambiguity distinction. 
  A scale of moral evaluation of characters was used to check whether participants had 
perceived the differences in the morality of characters presented in the “ambiguous” and 
“unambiguous” versions of the clip. The moral evaluation scores in those clips should be 
significantly lower than those in the ambiguous clips, in which characters do both good and 
bad things.  
  For the character morality evaluation scale, a 4 (movie: HSF, TOG, TFH, WDL) by 2 
(ambiguity: ambiguous, unambiguous) mixed analysis of variance was run using the repeated  
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measures procedure of the SPSS General Linear Model. Tolerance to ambiguity was included 
as a covariate in the model. The “movie” variable was within subjects. Ambiguity was a 
between subjects variable.  
As expected, the results indicate a significant main effect of ambiguity F (1,152) = 
26.11; p < .001, partial η
2= .15, such that characters in the ambiguous movie versions were 
rated as morally better (M = 3.94, SE = .07) than characters in the unambiguous versions (M = 
3.43, SE = .07). Overall, the manipulation check worked as expected. 
  There are some indications that the manipulation did not work consistently across all 
four movie clips, or across the different movie orientation groups. Pairwise comparisons of a 
significant movie by ambiguity interaction F (3, 150) =6.60; p < .001, partial η
2= .12 indicate 
that in one of the movies the character‟s moral standing was not perceived as significantly 
different (TFH, p =.10,), whereas in the other three, he was (HSF, p < .001; TOG p < .01; 
WDL, p<.05). The manipulation of morality may not have worked for that specific movie. 
  As a second form of character evaluation, participants rated each character through a 
series of semantic differential items (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), in which each 
character was rated along seven point scales using polar words as anchors (i.e. active/passive; 
warm/cold). 4 of these items measured a moral dimension (good/bad; helpful/unhelpful; 
honest/dishonest; kind/unkind). Reliabilities for these moral semantic differential scales, per 
movie, were high (Cronbach‟s α HSF = .86; TOG = .88; TFH = .80; WDL = .83), and the 
mean of the four items was used to create a moral semantic differential scale for each movie. 
Because the negative moral words were located at the high point of the scale, lower values in 
this scale indicate higher moral ratings. 
  A 4 (movie: HSF,TOG,TFH,WDL) by 2 (ambiguity: ambiguous, unambiguous) 
mixed analysis of variance was run using the repeated measures procedure of the SPSS 
General Linear Model and the semantic differential moral scale as a dependent variable. 
Results for this second manipulation check show a significant main effect of ambiguity on  
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moral ratings F (1, 152) = 31.60; p < .001, partial η
2= .17. Characters‟ morality was rated 
significantly higher in the ambiguous (M = 3.9, SE = .07) than the unambiguous (M = 4.4, SE 
= .07) movie versions. There were no other main or interaction significant effects. According 
to this measure, the morality manipulation was effective.  
  Finally, a 4 (movie: HSF,TOG,TFH,WDL) by 2 (ambiguity: ambiguous, 
unambiguous) mixed analysis of variance was run using the repeated measures procedure of 
the SPSS General Linear Model and a single item evaluation of character complexity as the 
dependent measure. Results for the complexity manipulation check indicates a significant 
main effect of ambiguity on perceived complexity of the character (1, 152) = 4.13; p < .05, 
partial η
2= .03. Characters were rated as significantly more complex in the ambiguous (M = 
5.0, SE = .08) than the unambiguous (M = 4.8, SE = .08) movie versions. According to this 
measure, the moral ambiguity manipulation was effective in creating a perception of character 
complexity. 
  Taken together, the significant main effects of the ambiguity manipulation on 
character morality and character complexity allow us to confirm that the manipulation was 
overall effective in creating a perceived difference in both morality and complexity between 
the characters in the different movie versions. However, the manipulation of morality seems to 
have failed for at least one movie (TFH) according to the measure of perceived moral 
character. It was decided to eliminate this movie from the analyses, and we tested the study 
hypotheses only for the three movies in which the manipulation was unquestionably 
successful. 
Hypotheses Testing for Enjoyment and Character Liking  
  For all variables measured by Likert type item scales, the same mode of analysis was 
used. Namely, a 3 (Movie: HSF, TOG, WDL) by 2 (Ambiguity: ambiguous, unambiguous) by 
4 (Movie Enjoyment Orientation: dual, hedonic, eudaimonic, low) mixed analysis of variance 
was run using the repeated measures procedure of the SPSS General Linear Model.  Tolerance  
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to ambiguity scores were introduced as a covariate in the model. When the tolerance to 
ambiguity covariate had a significant effect, it was kept in the model and is reported in the 
analyses. When the covariate did not have a significant effect, it was removed from the model. 
In all cases, Movie is a within subjects variable, all other variables are between subjects. 
Number of participants for all variables measured by Likert type items was N = 154. The ideal 
number of participants per cell for this sample size would have been 19 to 20. However, 
because the enjoyment orientation variable was measured, not assigned, there were slight 
imbalances in the distributions of participants per cell. Also, the distribution of gender 
precluded us from including sex as a variable of analyses, mostly because there were not 
enough men at all the different category groups to detect differences in a statistically relevant 
way. A detailed reporting of significant differences is reported for each separate variable, and 
a summary table for all means across five Likert scale variables, including counts of 
participants for each treatment cell, is presented in Table 6 below.   
Movie enjoyment. Results show significant main effects of both Ambiguity (F (1, 145) 
= 5.27 p < .05, partial η
2= .04) and Movie Orientation (F (3, 145) = 4.06; p < .01, partial η
2= 
.08). Participants enjoyed more the ambiguous movie clips (M = 4.02, SE = .10) than the 
unambiguous movie clips (M = 3.7, SE =.10), a result that supports Hypothesis 1. Participants 
with dual movie enjoyment orientation were the most likely to enjoy the movie clips (M = 
4.24, SE = .15), whereas participants who rated as high hedonics were the least likely to enjoy 
the movie clips (M = 3.56. SE = .14). Pairwise comparisons show that the difference between 
those groups is the only significant one (p < .01). There were no significant differences in 
enjoyment between those groups and the other two (high eudaimonics = 3.91, SE = .13; low 
both = 3.72, SE = .15). This significant effect of movie enjoyment orientation on movie 
enjoyment was unexpected and it had not been considered in our hypotheses. 
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Table 6.  Means of Movie Enjoyment, Character Cognitive Liking, Character Affective   
Liking, Technical Evaluation of Authors and Willingness to Engage with Authors, across 
Movie Enjoyment Orientation and Movie Moral Ambiguity. (N = 154). 
 
 
Movie 
Enjoyment 
Character 
Affective 
Character 
Cognitive 
Author 
Technical 
Author 
Engagement 
 
Low 
 
      Ambiguous(19) 
      Unambiguous(13) 
 
3.75 (.15) 
 
3.99 (.19) 
3.51 (.23) 
 
2.88 (.12) 
 
3.02 (.16) 
2.75 (.19) 
 
4.14 (.14) 
 
4.20 (.18) 
4.08 (.21) 
 
4.33 (.11) 
 
4.50 (.14) 
4.16 (.17) 
 
3.50 (.15) 
 
3.81 (.19) 
3.19 (.23) 
 
Hedonic 
 
      Ambiguous(18) 
      Unambiguous(27) 
 
3.50 (.13) 
 
3.93 (.20) 
3.05 (.16) 
 
2.80 (.11) 
 
3.15 (.16) 
2.45 (.14) 
 
4.16 (.12) 
 
4.51 (.18) 
3.81 (.15) 
 
4.46 (.10) 
 
4.78 (.15) 
4.13 (.12) 
 
3.69 (.13) 
 
4.01 (.20) 
3.38 (.16) 
 
Eudaimonic 
 
      Ambiguous(23) 
      Unambiguous(23) 
 
3.95 (.12) 
 
3.93 (.18) 
3.96 (.18) 
 
3.01 (.12) 
 
3.22 (.14) 
2.81 (.15) 
 
4.41 (.11) 
 
4.41 (.16) 
4.40 (.16) 
 
4.53 (.09) 
 
4.56 (.13) 
4.51 (.13) 
 
3.91 (.12) 
 
4.07 (.17) 
3.77 (.17) 
 
Dual 
 
      Ambiguous(16) 
      Unambiguous(15) 
 
4.26 (.15) 
 
4.19 (.21) 
4.32 (.22) 
 
3.13 (.12) 
 
3.50 (.17) 
2.77 (.18) 
 
4.74 (.14) 
 
4.77 (.19) 
4.70 (.20) 
 
4.96 (.11) 
 
4.86 (.16) 
5.06 (.16) 
 
4.52 (.15) 
 
4.46 (.21) 
4.58 (.22) 
 
 
Across Groups 
 
      Ambiguous(76) 
      Unambiguous(78) 
 
3.86 (.07) 
 
4.01 (.10) 
3.71 (.10) 
 
2.96 (.06) 
 
3.22 (.08) 
2.69 (.08) 
 
4.36 (.06) 
 
4.48 (.09) 
4.25 (.09) 
 
4.57 (.05) 
 
4.67 (.07) 
4.46 (.07) 
 
3.91 (.07) 
 
4.09 (.10) 
3.73 (.10) 
 
 
A significant interaction effect of Ambiguity by Movie Orientation (F (3, 145) = 2.67; 
p < .05, partial η
2= .05) may shed light on the main effect results. An examination of 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons for this interaction indicates that ambiguity makes 
a significant difference in enjoyment only for participants who rate as high hedonic. These 
participants were significantly less likely (p < .001) to enjoy the unambiguous movie (M =  
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3.12, SE = .20) than the ambiguous movie (M = 4.00, SE = .20).  Indeed, hedonics were 
significantly less likely to enjoy the unambiguous movies than eudaimonic (p < .05) and dual 
participants (p < .001). Hypothesis 6 predicted an interaction between ambiguity and movie 
enjoyment orientation, but it stated that viewers high in eudaimonicity would be more likely to 
enjoy ambiguous movies, whereas results indicate that these viewers liked both movie 
versions equally. H6 is not supported as it was formulated. However, as reported above, there 
is a significant interaction of movie enjoyment orientation and ambiguity, for the 
unambiguous movie clips.  
There was no significant main or interaction effect of movie on enjoyment, nor was 
there a significant effect of tolerance to ambiguity on enjoyment of the clips.  
Affective Character Evaluation. Ambiguity had a significant effect on affective 
evaluations of characters (F (1, 145) = 21.91; p < .001, partial η
2= .13). Participants were 
more likely to affectively like characters in ambiguous (M =3.22, SE = .08) than unambiguous 
versions of the movies (M = 2.70, SE = .08), a result that provides support for Hypothesis 2. 
This main effect appears while controlling for a significant effect of tolerance to ambiguity on 
affective liking of characters (F (1, 145) = 10.73; p < .001, partial η
2= .07), which indicates 
that overall participants with higher tolerance to ambiguity show higher levels of affective 
liking for characters. There were no other interactions or main effects for affective liking. 
Cognitive Character Evaluations. The only significant predictor of cognitive liking of 
character was Movie Orientation (F (3, 145) = 4.33; p < .01, partial η
2= .08). Dual oriented 
participants were the most cognitively appreciative of the characters (M = 4.74, SE =.14), 
followed by high eudaimonics (M = 4.41, SE =.11), high hedonics (M =4.14, SE = .12) and 
low in both (M = 4.16, SE = .14). Only the differences between the both high group and the 
high hedonic and both low groups are significant (p < .05 in both cases). Hypothesis 4, that 
participants high in eudaimonicity would cognitively like characters better than participants  
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low in eudaimonicity is partially supported (supported for the dual group, not supported for 
the eudaimonic group).  
There was no main effect of ambiguity on cognitive evaluation of the characters (H3 
is not supported) nor were there significant interaction effects of movie enjoyment orientation 
and ambiguity (H5 is not supported). However, the effect of the covariate tolerance to 
ambiguity on cognitive evaluation of characters was significant (F (1, 145) = 16.63; p < .01, 
partial η
2= .06). Overall, higher tolerance to ambiguity predicted higher levels of cognitive 
liking of characters.  
Hypotheses Testing for Moral and Extra-Narrative Thoughts 
  Analyses of thought list variables are based on the proportion of each kind of thought 
for each participant. Thus, for example, “moral thought proportion” corresponds to the number 
of moral thoughts produced by a participant for a movie, divided by the total number of 
thoughts produced by that participant for that movie. Two participants (out of the total 154) 
did not provide any thoughts for any movie and were dropped from these analyses. 
The model used for the analyses is the same as for Likert Scale variables, this is, a 3 
(Movie: HSF, TOG, WDL) by 2 (Ambiguity: ambiguous, unambiguous) by 4 (Movie 
Enjoyment Orientation: dual, hedonic, eudaimonic, low) mixed analysis of variance was run 
using the repeated measures procedure of the SPSS General Linear Model, with proportion of 
target thoughts as the dependent variable. 
  Moral thoughts. Two competing hypotheses (7a and 7b) proposed different rationales 
for the effect of movie ambiguity on the likelihood of expressing moral thoughts. There was 
no main effect of ambiguity on expression of moral thoughts, so none of the hypotheses is 
fully supported. The analyses for proportion of moral thoughts as response to the thought 
listing question indicate only one significant interaction effect of Ambiguity by Movie 
Orientation (F(3, 143) = 2.66, p = .05, partial η
2= .05). Hedonically oriented participants were 
significantly more likely to express moral thoughts when the movie was ambiguous (M = .13,  
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SE = .03) than when it was unambiguous (M = .06, SE = .02, p = .05). The hedonically 
oriented group behaved as predicted by H7a, suggesting that, for them, ambiguity fosters 
reflection about morality, whereas exclusivity of moral violations (unambiguous badness) 
does not. For all other enjoyment orientation groups, moral ambiguity did not make a 
difference in the expression of moral thoughts. H8, that eudaimonically oriented participants 
would be more likely than hedonically oriented participants to express moral thoughts is not 
supported (see Figure 1).  
Extra-narrative thoughts. Hypothesis 9 predicted that viewers high in eudaimonicity 
would be more likely to produce extra-narrative thoughts in response to the movie clips. 
Results show a significant main effect of movie enjoyment orientation on proportion of extra-
narrative thoughts (F (3,143) = 4.66, p <.001 partial η
2 = .09). Participants oriented to movies 
eudaimonically (M = .63, SE = .05) were significantly more likely than both hedonically 
oriented participants (M = .40, SE = .05, p < .01) and low movie orientation participants (M = 
.40, SE = .06, p < .05) to express extra narrative thoughts. Dual orientation participants (M = 
.45, SE = .06) did not significantly differ from the other groups in their expression of non 
story world thoughts. Hypothesis 9 is partially confirmed: viewers who were high only in the 
eudaimonicity scale were indeed more likely to produce extra-narrative thoughts, but viewers 
high in eudaimonicity and high in hedonicity (dual) were not more likely than the other groups 
to respond with extra-narrative thoughts. 
The different movies also elicited significant difference in extra-narrative thoughts 
expressed (F (1, 143) = 6.31, p < .01, partial η
2 = .04). Participants were significantly less 
likely to express non story world thoughts about House of Sand and Fog (M = .41, SE = .03) 
than about Twenty One Grams (M = .52, SE = .03, p < .05), whereas there were no significant 
differences regarding We don’t live here anymore (M = .48, SE = .03). There were no other 
significant main or interaction effects.  
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Figure 1. Proportion of moral thoughts by ambiguity and movie orientation (N = 152) 
 
  Extra-narrative thoughts were coded into four different categories: self, world, actors 
and authors, and analyses were conducted for the proportion of thoughts for each of these 
categories. Ambiguity and Enjoyment Orientation did not have any main or interaction effects 
on proportion of thoughts about the self. Hypothesis 10, that stated that ambiguous movies 
would be more likely to elicit self thoughts than unambiguous ones, and Hypothesis 11, that 
stated that participants high in eudaimonicity would be more likely than those low in 
eudaimonicity to express thoughts about the self, are rejected. The independent variables in 
this study failed to make a difference in expressed thoughts about the self. 
There was a significant effect of movie enjoyment orientation in thoughts about the 
real world issues (F (3,143) = 8.27 p < .001, partial η
2 = .15). Eudaimonically oriented 
participants (M = .44, SE =.05) were significantly more likely than hedonically oriented 
participants (M = .19, SE =.05, p < .001) and low orientation participants (M = .13, SE =.06, p 
< .01) to express thoughts about real world issues. Dual oriented participants (M = .26, SE 
=.05) did not significantly differ from other groups in their expression of real world issues 
thoughts. Hypothesis 12, that viewers high in eudaimonicity would be more likely to express 
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real world thoughts is partially supported (only for the exclusively eudaimonic group). There 
were no other significant effects regarding thoughts about real world issues.  
Valence, Emotion, Interrogative thoughts. This project offered no hypotheses 
regarding the proportion of emotion thoughts, the valence of thoughts, or the proportion of 
interrogative thoughts. However, these variables were analyzed as part of an exploration of 
participants thought list responses. All of the significant results found in the analyses of these 
variables involve movie effects rather than effects of the independent variables of interest 
(ambiguity and movie enjoyment orientation). 
Analyses of thought valence were conducted by creating two separate variables: proportion of 
positive thoughts and proportion of negative thoughts. For both variables, there were no 
significant main effects of movie enjoyment orientation or moral ambiguity. However there 
was a significant main effect of movie on proportion of negative thoughts (F (2, 143) =10.39, 
p < .001, partial η
2= .13). Participants were more likely to express negative thoughts about 
House of Sand and Fog (M = .84, SE = .07) than about both Twenty One Grams (M = .44, SE 
= .07, p < .001) and We don’t live here anymore (M = .55, SE = .07, p < .01). Analysis on 
proportion of emotion thoughts indicated no significant or main or interaction effects. 
Results of the analysis for interrogative thoughts show a significant movie by movie 
enjoyment orientation interaction (F (3, 143) =2.71, p < .05). Eudaimonically oriented 
participants were significantly less likely than low movie orientation participants to include 
questions, uncertainty or curiosity as part of their thought list, in both House of Sand and Fog 
(Eud ME = .12, SE = .05; Low ME = .32 SE = .06 ; p < .05) and Twenty One Grams (Eud ME 
= .18, SE = .05; Low ME =  .42 SE =  .07 ; p < .05).   
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Table 7. Means of extra- narrative thought proportion, and proportions of extra-narrative 
sub-categories, across Movie Enjoyment Orientations and Ambiguity (N=152). 
 
  Self  Real World   Actor 
 
Author 
 
Overall 
 
Low 
 
      Ambiguous(18) 
      Unambiguous(12) 
 
.07 (.02) 
 
.05 (.03) 
.10 (.04) 
 
.13 (.06) 
 
.13 (.07) 
.12 (.09) 
 
.03 (.01) 
 
.01 (.02) 
.06 (.02) 
 
.17 (.04) 
 
.16 (.05) 
.18 (.06) 
 
.40 (.06) 
 
.34 (.08) 
.46 (.10) 
 
Hedonic 
 
      Ambiguous(18) 
      Unambiguous(26) 
 
.07 (.02) 
 
.07 (.03) 
.06 (.02) 
 
.19 (.05) 
 
.23 (.07) 
.14 (.06) 
 
.03 (.01) 
 
.02 (.02) 
.03 (.01) 
 
.12 (.03) 
 
.05 (.05) 
.18 (.04) 
 
.40 (.05) 
 
.38 (.08) 
.41 (.07) 
 
Eudaimonic 
 
      Ambiguous(23) 
      Unambiguous(23) 
 
.08 (.02) 
 
.06 (.03) 
.11 (.03) 
 
.44 (.05) 
 
.44 (.06) 
.44 (.06) 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
.02 (.02) 
 
.08 (.03) 
 
.13 (.04) 
.04 (.04) 
 
.63 (.05) 
 
.65 (.07) 
.61 (.07) 
 
Dual 
 
      Ambiguous(16) 
      Unambiguous(15) 
 
 
.06 (.02) 
 
.04 (.03) 
.08 (.03) 
 
.26 (.05) 
 
.28 (.08) 
.23 (.08) 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
.03 (.02) 
.02 (.02) 
 
.11 (.04) 
 
.12 (.05) 
.10 (.05) 
 
.45 (.06) 
 
.47 (.08) 
.43 (.09) 
 
Across Groups 
 
      Ambiguous(75) 
      Unambiguous(76) 
 
.07 (.01) 
 
.05 (.01) 
.09 (.01) 
 
.25 (.03) 
 
.27 (.04) 
.23 (.04) 
 
.03 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
.03 (.01) 
 
.12 (.02) 
 
.12 (.02) 
.12 (.02) 
 
.47 (.03) 
 
.46 (.04) 
.48 (.04) 
 
Hypotheses Testing for Author Engagement  
Author Thoughts. There were no significant main or interaction effects of ambiguity 
or movie enjoyment orientation on proportion of author thoughts. Hypothesis 13, that 
ambiguous movies would elicit more author thoughts than unambiguous movies, and 
Hypothesis 15, that eudaimonic viewers would be more likely to report thoughts about movie 
authors, are rejected. Regarding Hypothesis 16, that eudaimonic and hedonic participants 
would differ more in their expression of author thoughts when movies were ambiguous than  
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when they were unambiguous, it is rejected when the alpha value of .05 is used. There is, 
however, a close to significant interaction effect of Ambiguity and Movie Enjoyment 
Orientation on proportion of author thoughts (F (3,143) = 2.61, p = .07,   partial η
2 = .05) 
which we report here because it is directly relevant to a key hypothesis of this study, and 
because the comparison between the target categories of interest is statistically significant. 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicate that hedonically oriented participants 
were significantly less likely to express author thoughts when movies were ambiguous (M = 
.05, SE = .05) than when they were unambiguous (M = .18, SE = .04, p < .05). Hypothesis 16 
receives some support inasmuch as there is an interaction effect. However, the original 
prediction was that ambiguous movies would foster author thoughts in eudaimonic 
participants, whereas the data support the notion that ambiguous movies discourage hedonic 
participants from thinking about authors (see Figure 2). For the other enjoyment orientation 
groups, movie ambiguity did not make a significant difference on expression of author 
thoughts. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of author thoughts by ambiguity and movie orientation (N = 152). 
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Movie had significant main effects on proportion of thoughts about actors (F (1,143) 
= 4.32, p < .05 partial η
2 = .03) and about authors (F (1,143) = 7.7,  p = .001, partial η
2  = .05). 
In both cases, the pattern was the same. Participants were more likely to express thoughts 
about actors (M = .04 , SE = .01,) and authors (M = .16 , SE = .03) when discussing Twenty 
One Grams than either House of Sand and Fog ( Actors M = .02, SE = .01, p < .05 ; Authors 
M =.09 , SE =.02 p < .01) or We don’t live here anymore (Actors M = .02, SE = .01 p < .05; 
Authors M =.12 , SE =.02, p < .05).  
Author engagement. Results show significant main effects of Ambiguity (F (1, 145) = 
7.87; p < .01, partial η
2= .05) and Movie Orientation (F (3, 145) = 8.70, p < .001, partial η
2= 
.15) on willingness to engage with author information after watching the movie. Participants 
were more likely to further want to engage with author information if they saw the ambiguous 
version of the movie (M = 4.10, SE = .10) than the unambiguous version (M = 3.71, SE = 
.10), a result that provides support for Hypothesis 14.  Hypothesis 17 stated that participants 
high in eudaimonicity would be the most likely to want to engage with author information. 
Participants who had a dual  
orientation to movie enjoyment were the most likely to further want to engage with authors (M 
= 4.51, SE = .15). The ratings of this group were significantly higher than the ratings of each 
of the other groups (High eudaimonic M = 3.87, SE =.13, p < .01; High hedonic M = 3.76, SE 
= .14, p < .01; Low both M = 3.47, SE = .15, p < .001). Differences among the other three 
groups were not statistically significant. Hypothesis 17 is partially supported: supported for 
the dual group, but not for the eudaimonic group. There was no significant interaction of 
movie enjoyment orientation and ambiguity; Hypothesis 18 is not supported.  
Author Technical Evaluation. Results show main effects of both Ambiguity (F (1, 
145) = 4.17; p < .05, partial η
2= .03) and Movie Orientation (F (3, 145) = 6.17; p < .001, 
partial η
2= .11) on technical evaluations of authors. Participants were more likely to evaluate 
authors as technically proficient when movies were ambiguous (M = 4.67, SE = .07) than  
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when they were unambiguous (M = 4.46, SE = .07). Also, dual oriented participants gave the 
highest ratings of technical proficiency to authors (M = 4.97, SE = .11). The ratings of this 
group were significantly higher than the ratings of each of the other groups (High eudaimonic 
M = 4.53, SE =.09, p < .05; High hedonic M = 4.45, SE = .10, p < .01; Low both M = 4.33, SE 
= .11, p < .001). Differences among the other three groups were not statistically significant.  
A significant interaction of Ambiguity and Movie Orientation (F (3, 145) = 3.14; p < 
.05, partial η
2= .06) indicates that although there are no significant technical evaluation 
differences among groups when movies are ambiguous, there is a significant difference 
between dual orientation participants and each of the three other movie enjoyment orientation 
groups. When movies are unambiguous, participants high in both orientations gave 
significantly higher ratings (M = 5.06, SE = .16) than participants that were High eudaimonic 
(M = 4.51, SE = .13, p < .05), High hedonic (M = 4.13, SE = .12, p < .001) and Low both (M 
= 4.17, SE = .17, p < .001). Differences among the latter three groups were not significant. 
Tolerance to ambiguity was also significant in this model F (1, 145) = 5.14; p < .05, 
partial η
2= .03) such that participants with higher tolerance to ambiguity were more likely to 
give higher technical author evaluations.   
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Character Liking and Movie Enjoyment 
  Traditional Affective Disposition Theory states that  viewers will develop a 
positive affective disposition (affective liking) towards characters that are morally 
good, and that they will enjoy a movie more if those good characters are rewarded in 
the end of the movie. In this study, participants were indeed more likely to create 
positive affective dispositions towards character that showed some moral goodness 
(ambiguous) than towards those that were unambiguously bad, which indicates that 
participants respond positively (in terms of affective affiliation) to even small signs of 
goodness in otherwise evil characters (see summary of predictions and results in Table 
8 below). Still, ratings of affective liking were not extremely high in any of the 
conditions (average affective liking was 2.96 for a 1-6 point scale), clearly an 
indication that morally reprehensible actions were also taken into account as part of 
the character evaluations. Morally good behaviors in the ambiguous characters were 
enough to make them more likeable than unambiguously bad characters, but not 
overwhelmingly liked. This pattern was consistent for all participants, regardless of 
their movie enjoyment orientation.  
 Overall, participants enjoyed the movie clips more when characters were 
morally ambiguous than when they were unambiguously bad. Since in these movie 
clips there was no clear sense of how the characters ended (endings were open at their 
best, unhappy at their worst –in any case, no character was rewarded), it is hard to 
interpret this result in light of traditional ADT. Enjoyment does not seem to be based 
directly on rewarding of the somewhat good characters, but it is possible that the lack 
of clear punishment for the unambiguously bad character decreased the enjoyment  
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ratings for those movies. The results for movie enjoyment run parallel to the results on 
character affective liking: movies with ambiguous characters (more affectively liked) 
were enjoyed more than movies with unambiguously bad characters (less affectively 
liked). Most of this difference, however, stems from viewers with an exclusively 
hedonic movie enjoyment orientation, who seemed to particularly dislike the 
combination of lack of positive morality and absence of punishment. 
On the other hand, participants who rated high in both eudaimonicity and 
hedonicity were more likely to think the characters were cognitively interesting. This 
group was also more likely to enjoy the movies regardless of the movie’s ambiguity 
level. It may be that having a dual orientation to movies provides people with more 
flexibility regarding the way they receive a film. If the character presents some 
morally good traits, and is thus more likeable in affective terms, they can rely on 
affective liking of the character to enjoy the movie. If the character is unambiguously 
bad, is hard to like in affective terms, and goes unpunished, they can turn to cognitive 
aspects of the movie, and base their enjoyment on cognitive interest in the character. 
This may explain why dual participants enjoyed movies more than any other group, 
and significantly more than the hedonic and low groups, that are not motivated to find 
cognitive gratifications in movies. Indeed, since none of the two conditions presented 
a traditional narrative schema in which completely good guys receive a well deserved 
reward, it is not surprising that hedonically oriented participants were the least likely 
to enjoy the movies overall.  
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Table 8. Comparison table of hypotheses and findings, by dependent variable. 
   
Main Effects of Movie 
Enjoyment Orientation 
 
   
Main Effects of Moral 
Ambiguity  
   
Interaction Effects  
  Hypothesis  Finding    Hypothesis  Finding    Hypothesis   Finding 
 
Movie 
Enjoyment 
 
No  
Prediction 
 
 
D  > H 
   
H1 
A  > U 
 
 
A  > U 
   
H7 (A) 
D E > H L 
 
For H 
A  > U  
 
Affective 
Liking 
 
No 
Prediction 
 
No  
Effect 
   
H3 
A  > U 
 
 
A  > U 
   
No 
Prediction 
 
No 
Effect 
 
Cognitive 
Liking 
 
H5 
D E > H L 
 
 
D  > H L  
   
H4 
A  > U 
 
No  
Effect 
   
H6 (A) 
D E > H L 
 
No  
Effect 
 
Extra-
narrative 
Thoughts 
 
 
H9 
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Previous research on enjoyment movies with ambiguous and bad characters 
has proposed that these movies are enjoyed more because they provide cognitive 
interest. In this study, cognitive interest in characters was, in absolute terms, higher  
65 
than affective liking for characters. However, enjoyment of the movie overall followed 
the pattern of affective liking rather than the pattern of cognitive interest. It is true that 
viewers who are motivated to watch movies for both hedonic and eudaimonic 
gratifications were more likely to find cognitive interest in the characters, and to enjoy 
the movies more, but this appears to be a factor of their individual characteristics as 
viewers. Apparently it is necessary to have some orientation towards cognitive 
gratifications to enjoy movies with morally ambiguous and morally bad characters.  
Extra- narrative thoughts: self and the real world 
  This study explored responses to movie narratives, beyond enjoyment. In particular, 
the study probed for responses showing that participants connected the story content with the 
real world, the self, and the story‟s authors. To probe for such thoughts, participants were 
offered the opportunity to list issues they might talk about if they were to discuss the movie 
with others.  
Participants high in eudaimonicity and those who watched the ambiguous movie clips 
were expected to be more likely to propose discussion topics beyond the movie‟s plot and 
characters.  Results showed that participants who rated high in eudaimonicity and low in 
hedonicity were significantly more likely to propose topics of discussion that go beyond 
character and plots. In their case, extra-narrative thoughts are the majority of thoughts 
produced (63% on average), whereas for all other groups the majority of thoughts were 
narrative. This result is expected, inasmuch as high eudaimonics are likely to seek 
meaningfulness, connection and insight about the world and humanity in movies. At the same 
time, it is intriguing because it indicates that preponderance of extra-narrative thoughts 
requires not only the predicted high level of eudaimonic motivation, but a low hedonic 
orientation level. Participants who were high in both eudaimonic and hedonic orientations 
were more likely to behave, in this regard, like those whose motivations are exclusively 
hedonic, and even like those who rate low in both enjoyment motivations. Dual oriented  
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participants, who are more likely to enjoy different kinds of movies, chose to stay mostly 
within the narrative world when listing topics of interest, as did those who rate low in 
eudaimonic motivations. One possibility is that this group considered the “others” implied in 
the question (the ones with which the movie would be discussed) and, having the choice to 
focus on narrative  or extra-narrative issues, tended to focus  on the narrative world, which 
may be a more likely common ground of interest. Exclusively eudaimonic participants, who 
are probably more adamant in their motivation to connect movies to real world issues, 
proposed thoughts that correspond closely to their sole orientation.  
Across all groups, the overwhelming majority of extra-narrative thoughts listed were 
thoughts about real-world issues. Expectedly, the exclusively eudaimonic group was more 
likely to propose real world issues as topics of discussion. Again, the dual group, from which 
a similar pattern was expected, behaved instead similarly to the low eudaimonic groups. The 
explanation for this discrepancy may be the one proposed above. More interestingly, there 
were no differences among any of the groups regarding thoughts about the self. Viewers high 
in eudaimonicity, who were expected to connect the movie to the self significantly more than 
those high in hedonicity, or low in both, were just as likely –or rather just as unlikely, to 
propose discussion topics that explicitly connected movie content to the self. This study failed 
to find evidence that the eudaimonic motivation to search for meaning includes a motivation 
to meaningfully connect the movie content to the self, a finding that sheds a dimming light on 
the hopes that movies are used as a tool for self development, even among the most thoughtful 
viewers. Overall, thoughts about the self were scarce, averaging 3% of thoughts produced. 
Lack of significant differences among groups in this variable may be due to difficulty 
detecting significant differences at such low values. 
The results indicate that character moral ambiguity had virtually no effect on 
production of extra-narrative thoughts. Across the ambiguity conditions, presence of extra-
narrative thoughts was constant, averaging 47% of thoughts produced. Contrary to our  
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prediction, movies with unambiguously bad characters were just as likely as movies with 
ambiguous characters to foster discussion about extra-narrative issues, a pattern that is 
consistent across the extra-narrative sub-categories of real world thoughts and self thoughts. 
The absence of increased self thoughts for ambiguous movies is particularly surprising since 
there is previous evidence that people will refer to their personal experiences and beliefs in 
order to address ambiguity in narratives (Hakemulder, 2000). It is likely that some answers 
coded as “real world” answers were actually references to personal beliefs, attitudes and 
experiences, but since they were not explicit about the connection to the self, they were not 
detected by our coding scheme. Another possibility is that participants were reluctant to bring 
up personal issues as part of an imagined conversation with others, or an actual exposure to 
the experimental analysis. For whatever reasons, presence of thoughts about the self was 
uniformly low, and unaffected by any of the independent variables in this study.  
Thinking about authors 
  Extra-narrative thoughts about authors were of particular interest to this study, 
inasmuch as they are evidence that participants consider the movies in a communicationally 
sophisticated way. The need to address the authors‟ presence, their technical failures and 
successes, or their intentions, are evidence that viewers are both aware of authors, and willing 
to engage in an, at least, imaginary communicative act with them. Considering whether 
authors intend to create a melodrama or an action movie, criticizing editing failures, 
applauding cinematographic achievements, etc., are all ways of conveying that an intention is 
recognized and the success or failure of the intention is evaluated. In the same way, reference 
to authors‟ stance regarding the movie content also reflects awareness that a movie is a crafted 
message. A willingness to discuss a movie‟s topic (i.e. infidelity , organ donation, privacy,) as 
a topic for which someone (the author) has made a point, makes it the viewer‟s turn to respond 
with their own agreement or disagreement, and maybe ponder their previously held positions 
in response to the perceived movie message. In particular, morally ambiguous characters were  
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expected to elicit some of these kinds of thoughts, in which the moral ambiguity of characters 
is referred back to the authors that created them.  
  The analysis of the thought list for thoughts about authors did not provide statistically 
significant results. However, the close to significant interaction of ambiguity and movie 
enjoyment orientation is intriguing. Participants who rated high in a hedonic orientation to 
movies were more likely to engage in thoughts about authors when movies presented an 
unambiguously bad protagonist than when they presented an ambiguous character. For this 
group, exclusive badness fostered significantly more author thoughts than moral ambiguity. 
These thoughts, like most author thoughts in this study, focused on technical and genre 
discussions– and considering that unambiguous movies were less likely to be enjoyed by this 
group, it is likely that they pointed to technical failures and other forms of criticism of authors. 
High hedonics expect to get positive affect from movies, which the unambiguously bad 
movies failed to provide. In response to this failure of the message to match their preferred 
expectation, hedonically oriented participants were more likely than the other groups to turn to 
thoughts about the authors, rather than, for example, to thoughts about the self (i.e. “I don‟t 
like these kinds of movies”, “This movie depressed me”, “I would prefer a different movie 
next time”).  
Interest in authors 
  The thought lists analyzed above were not the only measure designed to evaluate 
participants‟ attitudes towards movie authors. After viewing all four movies, participants 
answered a series of questions that directly asked for both technical evaluations of authors, 
and inquired whether they were interested in finding out more information about the authors 
and their intentions in creating these particular movies. These two scales have the advantage 
of distinguishing between technical author concerns, and concerns related more directly to the 
movie‟s content and message.   
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  As predicted, participants reported more interest in knowing more about authors‟ 
intentions when movies were ambiguous, and participants high in eudaimonic motivation (in 
particular, participants high in both eudaimonic and hedonic motivations) were the most likely 
to be willing to engage with authors. Ambiguous movies, however, failed to encourage even 
higher levels of interest from eudaimonic groups, as had been predicted.  
Participants were not only more interested in finding out more about authors when 
movies were ambiguous than when they were unambiguous, they were also more likely to 
think that the authors of the movie were more technically proficient for ambiguous movies 
than the unambiguous ones. Dual oriented participants were more likely to think that authors 
were technically proficient than all the other groups. Dual oriented participants were also 
significantly more likely than all the other groups to judge the authors of unambiguous movies 
as technically proficient.  
The fact that, as discussed earlier, dual participants have two paths towards movie 
enjoyment makes them the most likely group to make positive evaluations about movie 
authors. It is possible that since their set of expectations for enjoyment is multifaceted, they 
are more likely to be appreciative of what is offered to them. Since they are more satisfied 
than any other group, they might be expected, by some accounts, to be less interested in 
further engagement with authorial figures. If expectations of the receiver are met by the 
message, there is no need to refer to the author for clarification. However, this group is also 
the most likely to be interested in seeking further information about authors, and the most 
likely to be interested in further information regarding the unambiguous movies.  
A possible interpretation of these results is that for the dual group, new information 
from authors whose movies were enjoyed is likely to shed more light on the meaning and 
purpose of the movie (a eudaimonic gratification) and maybe extend hedonic gratification by 
allowing an opportunity to remember and revisit positive feelings experienced while watching. 
Thus, the dual orientation to movies allows for both a broader spectrum of enjoyable films,  
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and an expectation that both kinds of gratifications received from a movie may outlast the time 
frame of the viewing experience.  
Moral thoughts and other results 
  Of the two competing hypotheses for the proportion of moral thoughts as responses to 
the thought list item, there was partial support for the one stating that moral ambiguity in a 
movie protagonist would elicit more thoughts about moral issues than unambiguous badness. 
However, it was only participants oriented hedonically that responded in this way. Moral 
behavior of the character had no effect on the other groups‟ likelihood to mention moral issues 
as topics of discussion, and, if anything, participants oriented eudaimonically followed the 
opposite pattern, giving more moral responses when characters were unambiguously bad. 
Previous research had indicated that participants were more likely to mention moral issues 
when reviewing a movie with presence of moral ambiguity than when reviewing a movie with 
clearly differentiated good and bad characters. The mixed results here suggest that there may 
be different paths towards moral thinking for participants who have different paths to movie 
enjoyment.  
  Participants oriented hedonically are seeking a movie in which they can find positive 
affect towards a character and see that character be rewarded, a narrative template known to 
provide the affective gratification they seek. An unambiguously bad character is unlikely to 
fulfill that expectation, and hedonically oriented participants disliked such characters, failed to 
find them interesting, and did not particularly enjoy the movies they were in. It is possible that 
they disengage from these characters completely, which decreases the chance that they ponder 
the moral issues these characters are involved in. On the other hand, an ambiguous protagonist 
holds some promise of being the „good‟ character needed if they are to be able to apply their 
favored enjoyment schema. Hedonically oriented participants may engage in thoughtfulness 
about the character morality in order to determine whether it is possible to accept this  
71 
character as the “good guy”, root for him/her, and engage fully with the schema that they 
know to be successful to enjoy fictional drama. 
  Participants oriented eudaimonically are more interested in movies that help them 
make meaning of the world. Thus, they may be less likely to process a movie in terms of a 
traditional narrative enjoyment schema (who is good, who is bad, who do I want to see 
rewarded), and more likely to process it as a reflection of reality. Eudaimonically oriented 
participants might be more interested in the way in which the movie‟s moral issues are related 
to the real world than in the moral status of the character him/herself. If this is the case, we 
might expect their moral thoughts to be mostly extra-narrative –in particular, about the real 
world, than narrative thoughts about the protagonists‟ character.  Testing this idea more 
precisely is an intriguing avenue for future research in this area.   
Role of Tolerance to Ambiguity 
  Throughout the analyses of the data, scores in a scale for tolerance to ambiguity were 
used as a covariate in the statistical models. Moral ambiguity was a key manipulation and 
predictive factor in our hypotheses, and it made sense to consider that individual differences in 
tolerance to ambiguity might have an effect on participants‟ responses to the movies. 
Interestingly, tolerance to ambiguity did not have significant effects on any of the thought 
listing variables. Participants‟ open ended reactions to the movies were unaffected by 
individual differences in this variable, which is a general cross-domain measure of openness to 
different experiences, acceptance of uncertainty, and acceptance of diversity, whereas in some 
cases –as discussed above, a more domain specific measure of a similar tendency –
eudaimonicity, did have some effects. In thinking about the topics that they were likely to 
discuss with friends, domain specific differences in openness (eudaimonicity) seemed to make 
a difference, but non-specific orientations towards openness (tolerance to ambiguity) were 
unlikely to be relevant.   
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  When evaluating movies through scale items, however, tolerance to ambiguity did 
make a difference for some variables. Participants higher in tolerance to ambiguity were more 
likely to like characters both affectively and cognitively; and they were more likely to give 
authors higher ratings of technical proficiency. In these three cases, the effect of tolerance to 
ambiguity appeared only as a main effect, this is, across movie ambiguity conditions and 
movie enjoyment orientations. Thus, although the study found some evidence that tolerance to 
ambiguity has an effect on movie appreciation (namely, increasing positive forms of 
evaluation of characters and authors), in none of those cases did it account for the effect of 
movie ambiguity on the dependent variable, and, more importantly, it controlled for the 
possible confound with movie enjoyment orientations. 
  Tolerance to ambiguity had no effect on measures of movie enjoyment or interest in 
authors. In general, the behavior of tolerance to ambiguity as a covariate indicates that 
although at times it enhanced evaluations of the movies, it did so across the board, probably 
due to the positive attitude to new stimuli that people who rate high in this scale have. 
However, tolerance to ambiguity does not seem to explain or affect differences created by 
moral ambiguity levels of the movies, nor does it seem to explain the same proportion of 
variance that high scores in eudaimonicity do, despite the high correlation between the two 
variables (.30, p < .001). Tolerance to ambiguity‟s effects appear to be general effect of broad 
openness to new and strange stimuli, whereas effects of movie enjoyment orientation seem to 
be domain specific –linked to participants‟ specific attitudes towards movies and stories.  
Summary of moral ambiguity effects 
  Effects of moral ambiguity were, overall, fewer than expected. In particular, 
ambiguous movies did not seem to provoke an increase in thoughtful responses such as higher 
cognitive interest for the ambiguous characters, higher proportion of extra-narrative thoughts 
about the self, the real world or the movies‟ authors, or higher proportion of morality thoughts.  
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Per this study, character moral ambiguity in the message is not enough, on its own, to elicit 
these kinds of thoughtful responses.   
Ambiguous characters were more likely to be affectively liked and movies with 
ambiguous characters were more likely to be enjoyed than unambiguous ones. These results 
seem to be driven by affective processes.  However, ambiguous movies were also more likely 
to produce higher technical proficiency ratings for authors, and higher interest in engaging 
with further author information. The inclination of participants to give higher ratings to 
authors of movies they enjoyed more may be expected. However, higher interest in further 
engagement with the author (willingness to read interviews, find out the authors‟ intentions in 
making the film) is a sign that, regardless of their movie enjoyment orientation, viewers‟ 
interest in maintaining some form of communicative engagement with authors of fictional 
messages can be increased by the presence of moral ambiguity in a character. Whether this 
motivation stems from the fact that the movie was enjoyed and participants expect a 
continuation of positive affective gratification, or whether it stems from cognitive interest in 
reflecting upon issues unresolved in the movie, is not completely clear from the pattern of 
results in this study, but there are some indications that motivations for continued engagement 
may be different for hedonic and eudaimonic participants. 
Hedonically oriented participants were significantly less likely to enjoy unambiguous 
movies and, at the same time, significantly more likely to propose movie authors‟ issues as 
part of their thought listing for those movies. This combination of results may be an 
indication, as discussed previously, that hedonically oriented participants are likely to turn to 
authorial thoughts when frustrated in their affective gratifications expectations. On the other 
hand, hedonics were the only group that was more likely to respond to morally ambiguous 
movies with increased thoughts about morality.  Overall, hedonics were the group most 
affected by differences in the characters‟ moral status, showing both some signs of frustration 
when the movie‟s moral schema did not allow for positive gratification, and signs of increased  
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interest and focus on morality when the movie‟s moral ambiguity offered a potential for such 
gratifications.  
The other participants affected by differences in movie morality were dual oriented 
participants, who were significantly more likely to give high technical proficiency ratings to 
the authors of unambiguous movies, in what may be interpreted as a sign of their flexible path 
towards movie evaluation. 
Summary of movie enjoyment orientation effects 
  Most of the hypotheses involving movie enjoyment orientation groups predicted that 
participants high in eudaimonic orientations would engage with movies in more thoughtful 
ways than their low eudaimonicity counterparts: being more likely to engage with characters 
cognitively, producing more extra-narrative thoughts connecting the movies with the self, the 
world and the authors, showing more interest in seeking further authorial information, 
expressing more moral thoughts about movies. Moreover, these more thoughtful responses 
were expected to be particularly salient when movies were morally ambiguous, since 
ambiguity is the kind of cognitive challenge that these viewers are likely to prize.  
  High eudaimonicity viewers were overall more thoughtful in that they were more 
likely to find cognitive interest in characters and produce more thoughts about real world 
issues than low eudaimonic viewers. However, they were not any more thoughtful regarding 
the self, authors and morality. Neither did ambiguous movies significantly increase thoughtful 
responses in high eudaimonicity viewers. One possibility is that there was a ceiling effect for 
thoughtfulness, such that eudaimonic viewers are highly thoughtful for any kind of stimulus 
(i.e., the unambiguous movies), and at such high ratings, even a more challenging stimulus (an 
ambiguous movie clip) cannot make a difference. Another possibility is that high eudaimonic 
viewers found ambiguous and unambiguous movies equally engaging, but for different 
reasons. It is possible, for example, that whereas morally ambiguous movies are cognitively 
challenging because they present a complex character whose moral behavior requires some  
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reflection (requiring thoughtfulness about morality and the moral issues involved), 
unambiguously bad movies are cognitively challenging because they defy the traditional 
schemas for movie entertainment, a challenge that is cognitively engaging in a different level 
(thoughtfulness about extra-narrative content, or the movie as an artifact).  
  Some support for this second possibility is found in the differences between dual 
oriented and exclusively eudaimonic oriented participants. Eudaimonic viewers, were more 
likely than any other group to produce thoughts about the movie issues as real world issues, 
and they were somewhat (though not significantly more, see Figure 2) more likely to comment 
on moral issues when movies were unambiguous. They seem to have enjoyed the challenges 
posed by ambiguity and responded with thoughts about real world issues and morality. On the 
other hand, dual oriented participants gave significantly higher technical rating to authors of 
unambiguous movies than exclusively eudaimonic participants. This result, as well as their 
significantly higher level of interest in movie authors, can be interpreted as interest in and 
appreciation for authorial intentions and genres, in particular in response to movies that break 
the traditional narrative schema.  The difference between these two groups, both high in 
eudaimonicity, may be an indication that eudaimonic orientations may find different ways of 
engaging thoughtfully with a movie (content and artifact), both of them leading to enjoyment.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Design 
As with any study, the experiment presented here had some advantages and some 
disadvantages. The use of repeated measures for multiple messages is crucial to the claim that 
the effects found are due to the manipulated independent variable (in this case, moral 
ambiguity) rather than of idiosyncratic characteristics of the message. The messages presented 
here were different in the kind of moral violations presented, so effects can‟t be attributed 
either to specific responses to one kind of moral violation (infidelity, violation of privacy, 
domestic abuse, greed, murder, racism).  Still, the results can‟t be easily generalized to any 
kind of moral violation. The moral violations presented are mostly non-controversial: most 
people would agree that it is wrong to engage in such behaviors. Future studies in this area 
should address controversial or polarizing morally relevant issues (abortion, death penalty, 
homosexual relationships, teen pregnancy), which are likely to produce different responses in 
participants.   
Manipulating ambiguity through careful editing of real movies allowed for very 
precise and objective control of the manipulation, while still using complex stimuli. The 
movie sources for the clips were four critically acclaimed movies, and the target characters 
were portrayed by first rate actors. Thus, the stimuli had a level of ecological validity that 
experimentally created stories (even videos) might have lacked. High quality movies as these 
are likely to be transporting, this is, to produce in the viewer high levels of absorption into the 
story world. Transportation for the experimental stimuli was not measured, but it is likely to 
be equivalent to transportation levels had in real viewing contexts, for example, watching 
these films at home. The length of the clips (around 6 minutes), can be considered equivalent 
to a segment of TV fiction viewing.   
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The presence of well known actors may have had some undesired effects on the 
manipulation. A qualitative examination of the thought lists for the movie dropped from the 
analyses because of the failed manipulation (25
th Hour) showed a disproportionate number of 
comments about the actor portraying the main character (Edward Norton), most of them quite 
laudatory. The presence of an extremely well known and well loved actor may have interfered 
with the manipulation in this case. For almost all analyses run using all four movies, the 
effects found included interactions of the target independent variables with “movie”, in which 
the dropped movie (25
th hour) behaved differently from the other 3 movies. Since this 
difference could be explained by the failure of the manipulation, it was deemed appropriate to 
drop the movie, for clarity‟s sake. The qualitative evidence indicates that effects of actors‟ 
prestige and likeability on perceptions of characters‟ morality may well be its own topic of 
study. It is possible to speculate that the positive attitudes towards Norton made it hard for 
audiences to make moral distinctions between the “bad” version of his character, and the 
“ambiguous” one. From the observation here, it seems likely that a disliked actor (say, Mel 
Gibson) acting as a good hero may still be evaluated as less moral than a well liked actor 
(Edward Norton) acting as an antihero.  
  A very frustrating but to an extent inevitable disadvantage of this design, is that it 
could not include the complete scope of the character morality variable. At first sight, the ideal 
scenario would have been to compare unambiguously bad, ambiguous and unambiguously 
good characters. Such a design would definitely have helped answer some questions left 
unresolved here, in particular those attempting to distinguish affective disposition theory 
effects from effects that are responses to cognitive challenges of ambiguity. This design did 
not incorporate both kinds of unambiguous characters because it was extremely difficult to 
produce, from the same original movie, those three versions. The difficulty in doing so stems 
from a key narrative issue. A narrative must have some kind of conflict that triggers events 
and furthers the plot. In the case of our study, creating an “unambiguously good” version of  
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the character would have resulted in a plotless sequence of scenes –both boring and 
narratively incomprehensible. This may have been a result of the study focusing on one single 
character rather than in a contrast between a good character and a bad character. Experiments 
attempting to address the complete scope of the ambiguity variable may need to operationalize 
and manipulate ambiguity in a different way, using two or more characters. 
  Moreover, as suggested in the discussion section, manipulations of moral standing of 
characters may act simultaneously as manipulations of schema. Unambiguous evil may 
activate antihero schemas, unambiguous good may activate hero schemas, ambiguity and 
open-endedness seem to allow audiences the option to process the movie as their preferred 
schema, or to suspend schema “choice” until extra information is provided.  In this study, for 
example, outcomes were unclear, and outcomes may well be a late piece of information that 
viewers use to decide, in retrospect, what schema/genre the movie belongs to. This may be 
consistent with research in moral psychology indicating that people judge the morality of an 
act by its final consequences. Future research, then, will need to address consequences as part 
of the manipulation of morality in a film. Other forms of morality manipulation, such as the 
manipulation of an act and its consequences, rather than focus on a single character might be 
fruitful as well. In this study I chose to manipulate morality in characters, because judgments 
of characters are known to strongly drive comprehension and entertainment. However, 
manipulating moral ambiguity may be even more complicated than originally thought, and 
unambiguously bad/unambiguously good movies may not constitute a true polarity when 
narrative structures are involved, as they may activate different processing schemas/genres, 
and probably the levels of liking and interest associated to those schemas and genres. 
Practical Implications 
  As they stand, the results found here are not particularly promising for the status of 
media fictional narratives as a tool that prompts personal reflection, growth and moral 
development, at least not if development is expected to occur through thoughtfulness.  
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Thoughts connecting the contents of the narrative to the self were overall low, even in 
response to a question that proposed a scenario of close discussion with friends. Moral 
ambiguity in movies did not increase the proportion of thoughts connected to the self. At the 
very best, the results allow speculation that personal attitudes and beliefs emerged as part of 
the real world thoughts, with their link to the self invisible to the coding scheme used here. In 
such a scenario, the potential of movies to promote self development could be said to actualize 
at not completely conscious levels. At worst, the results can be interpreted as evidence that 
audience members are more likely to engage in thoughts about characters, authors, actors and 
the world at large than on the self. The fact that author thoughts appear more frequently than 
self thoughts provides both some evidence that authors are not as invisible to fiction readers as 
literary theory suggests they are (or should be), and that viewers are reluctant or unable to 
explicitly and consciously connect movie content to the self.    
  Results are much more promising when considered as vehicles for the reflection on 
social awareness issues. Thoughts about “real world issues” were very frequent, and they 
overwhelmingly included the social issues addressed in the movie, including issues that pro-
social agencies may be interested in bringing to society‟s attention (organ donation, immigrant 
stereotypes, privacy laws, domestic abuse, etc.). In this study, movies appeared to be quite 
successful at creating at least a temporary activation of those issues. For at least some of the 
viewers, hedonically oriented ones, activation of moral issues was also increased when movies 
were ambiguous. Moreover, the increased interest in engaging with authors and seeking more 
information about the movie‟s meaning and the authors‟ intention may be an indication that 
ambiguity is good characteristic for a movie to have when further engagement in information 
seeking is a desired outcome.  
Implications for the communicative dimension of narratives 
  This study set out to find evidence that, despite the claims that narratives are supposed 
to absorb viewers into the story world and make authors as invisible as possible, audiences do,  
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under certain circumstances, engage in thoughts about authors, specifically authorial 
intentions. Such evidence would indicate that, contrary to some conceptualizations of fiction, 
evaluations and thoughts about authors are part of the communicative processes that occur 
during fiction.  We proposed here that, regardless of conventions in storytelling and story 
interpretation that assume authorial invisibility as a necessity of successful fiction, sometimes 
thoughtfulness about authors may play an important role in the relationship that audiences 
have with a fictional message. To assess this possibility, participants‟ provided open ended 
thoughts about the movie clips, and responded to direct questions about their willingness to 
engage with further information about authors. Findings were mixed. Considerations about 
authorial intention did emerge as part of open ended responses, but they did so mostly as 
critical technical considerations (“this scene was well/badly written”) and as considerations 
about the movie‟s genre (“typical melodrama”). Open ended references to authors rarely, if 
ever, connected the author with the story line‟s plot or themes (“this movie seems to endorse 
mistreatment of women”), as might have been expected. On the other hand, ambiguity did 
increase interest in engaging with authorial information, specifically regarding the authors and 
writers intentions in producing the specific movies seen.  
Overall, findings indicate that spontaneous thoughts about authors are more related to 
technical and genre discussions than to movie content. In this sense, audiences negotiate their 
relationship with authors through discussion of met or unmet expectations about the ways a 
story is told and the main themes chosen (e.g., “I expect you to do X, you did Y”; “I am not 
interested in what you offer”), rather than through discussion of content detail and stances. In 
communicative terms, this would mean that, when considering authors, audiences are more 
likely to consider their role as a creator of a movie artifact than their role as a social actor with 
something to say regarding socially relevant content in the movie‟s plot.  The increased 
interest in authors of movies with ambiguous characters may be even more interesting in 
communicative terms. It indicates a willingness, on the part of audience members, to abandon  
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the ideally invisible author for the sake of clarification, extra information or answers to 
questions left open in the narrative itself. In this sense, it may well be that whereas authorial 
invisibility is desirable while watching a movie, and useful for the production of academic 
criticism of stories as self contained messages, authorial visibility is interesting to audiences, 
who are willing to engage them in order to extend their relationship with a story beyond the 
mere viewing experience. 
The results of this study may show that, whereas a story that successfully matches 
expectations of an audience does not require extensive communication grounding between 
authors and audiences, a story that has elements of ambiguity may ignite a more extended 
communicative process between audience and authors, in the form of technical evaluations 
and willingness to seek further authorial information. The idea that fiction, in general, is not 
communicative is untenable in principle, and, as shown by the results here, also questionable 
when exploring the actual responses of audiences. 
Future Directions in Research  
  Future research on movie enjoyment orientations should continue to examine the ways 
in which combinations of hedonic and eudaimonic tendencies produce different responses. 
The explanation suggested here, that dual oriented participants have a more flexible path 
towards movie enjoyment, should be further tested. Dual oriented viewers may be a group of 
participants that like movies more in general, but, throughout this study, dual oriented 
participants‟ responses aligned more closely to eudaimonic responses than to hedonic 
responses. Both high eudaimonicity groups seemed to be more appreciative of transgressions 
of the traditional moral narrative schema, as well as more likely to enjoy clips overall.  
High eudaimonic orientation may be related not only to search for meaning, but to 
openness to original aesthetic experiences, and an appreciation of movies as artifacts. On the 
contrary, hedonic participants seemed to respond positively to a more traditional schema, and 
seem less interested and appreciative of aesthetic artifact variations.   
82 
One final point of interest is the behavior of so-called low orientation participants. 
This group is, by their own reporting, low in both hedonic and eudaimonic motivations to 
watch movies: a group of people that might not like fiction films at all. Throughout most of 
this study, however, their responses did not significantly differ from those of the hedonically 
oriented group. These results may be an indication that populations who are not, in principle, 
interested in fictional film, may respond to them the way hedonic groups do when exposed to 
them. There are, however, some interesting caveats. Low oriented participants were not, as 
hedonics, less likely to enjoy unambiguous movies, less likely to think about authors when 
movies were unambiguously bad, nor were they more likely to produce moral thoughts when 
movies were ambiguous. It is possible that low oriented participants are less invested in 
obtaining a specific form of enjoyment from films, and so, paradoxically, they are more likely 
to reasonably enjoy any kind of message they are presented.  
The evidence, then, indicates that although the dual oriented group‟s behavior aligned 
more closely to the purely eudaimonic group‟s behavior, and the low oriented group‟s 
behavior aligned more closely to the hedonic group‟s behavior, there are significant 
differences in both cases that preclude us from concluding that the use of eudaimonic and 
hedonic orientations as separate variables is enough to explain audiences‟ responses to fiction.   
  Future research in this area will need to address the distinction between focus on 
authors as conveyers of problematic social ideas and focus on authors as technical craftsmen 
of artifacts. If audiences have an inclination to think of authors as related in some way to the 
real world issues they are addressing, this inclination might be more likely to appear when the 
movies address more controversial moral issues or moral issues that are particularly salient to 
certain groups, a direction that future research should definitely take.  
Finally, whether using consensual moral violations or more controversial 
moral topics, future research will also have to account for the ways in which moral 
standing of characters affects perceptions of genre and thus alters narrative schema  
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expectations. As reviewed earlier, and through results of this study, these two 
dimensions are connected. Viewers expecting a traditional drama are ready to identify 
good and bad guys, and need to do so to enjoy a film. If a character is hard to identify 
as good easily, viewers may need to reformulate their expectations either by 
reevaluating the genre of the movie and switching to a different enjoyment schema, or 
restructuring and possibly expanding the path towards enjoyment for a genre. It cannot 
be unproblematically assumed that audiences will process good, ambiguous and bad 
characters with the same set of schematic expectations.  Good characters may activate 
traditional narrative schemas, likely to be enjoyed by hedonically oriented audiences; 
bad characters may activate antihero schemas, likely to be enjoyed by audiences high 
in eudaimonicity. Ambiguous characters may be particularly problematic. It may well 
be that moral ambiguity does not produce a “moral ambiguity schema” of its own, but 
leaves schema open, and audiences free to align their expectations with their preferred 
schematic versions, or in need to create new schemas to approach such stories. 
 In the presence of ambiguity, hedonic audiences may hold on to the likelihood 
that the character is ultimately good, and will find, if not reward, at least meaning (and 
not punishment). Hedonically motivated audiences may expect that a movie with an 
ambiguous characters will end up aligning more or less to a traditional narrative 
schema, and react with frustration when, by the end of the movie, this does not 
happen. The results in this study can be interpreted to indicate this. On the other hand, 
participants oriented eudaimonically, who are more open to challenges from movies, 
may enjoy the ambiguous movie at face value, without expecting it to fulfill any 
particular template.  Such an attitude allows them to enjoy an ambiguous movie more 
than hedonics do, but not any more than they enjoy any other movie, which may 
explain the low impact of movie ambiguity on high eudaimonicity viewers. The idea 
that moral ambiguity in a movie may act not as a defined schema but as an undefined  
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template for differently motivated audiences to project their expectations is a 
consideration that should be closely examined in future research in the area.  
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